What is the radical right terrorist threat against the Netherlands? Here’s how we know…

The utter uselessness of the Dutch counter-terrorism intelligence and security apparatus. We read from the Dutch media that the utterly useless intelligence and security agencies, the AIVD and NCTb seriously believe that “jihad sites no longer threatening the Netherlands” (this is well known by yours truly) and “leftist terrorism is not a threat” (and actually never was).  So- according to these Ghostbusters – no terrorism of any kind threatens (READ no “allochtoon Muslim” and “leftist asylum seeker advocate groups” are “threatening terrorism”).  The AIVD and the rest of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus’ exclusive focus on hated groups – and this exclusive focus could be risky for the security of the Netherlands.  There have been real attacks against mosques around the Netherlands, which included shots fired at a mosque in Dorchtricht, threatening letters, arsons and an attempted bomb attack in Almelo where two men were arrested. We should know that there are other ways to measure a terrorist threat potential against the Netherlands other than useless declarations of “no threat from the right wing terrorism” that don’t acknowledge realities. Remember,  Germany also declared that there was “no threat from the right wing terrorism” this year.

The question is: What is the right wing terrorist threat against the Netherlands?  The framework for the assessment for the potential of right wing terrorism against the Netherlands will not claim that there are groups or individuals ready to launch terrorist attacks against mosques and allochtoon institutions. The purpose is to assess the current social and political climate for the favorability for right-wing terrorism to emerge and persist in the Netherlands. There is evidence of a growing threat of terroristic activity against especially mosques and a possible network. There is also evidence that attacks against Muslims are on the decline. Current reports from a wide variety of sources will be used to assess the right wing terrorist threat against the Netherlands and targeted communities.

The climate of terrorism formation and persistence study framework.  In borrowing from Eugine V. Walter, Grant Warlaw (1989) explains that the “process of terror” has three elements. The first is the act or threat of violence. Next is the emotional reaction to fear on the part of the victims or potential victims and the social effects that follow the act or threat of an act (12).  The social effects are some kind of change or giving into the demands of the terrorists (16). It is not just the act of violence, but the threat of violence, that is described as “terrorism.” The purpose of terrorism is to create a fear message through the threat or use of violence against another group or government.

Walter also argued, along the lines of Ted Gurr, that terror endures in a society that is without friendship and trust,  “a society in which people are isolated and atomized, divided by suspicions and mutual destructive rivalry, would support a system of terror better than a society without much chronic antagonism” (qtd. in Warlaw 1989, 12).  The cost of terrorism is lowest in ethnically divided societies where the victims are identified as “enemy” and “popular targets.” The community of support is very important for terrorist cells to last without detection or capture, as is an underground support system (Warlaw 1989, 13; Crewshaw 1998, 17; Gurr 1998, 86-87).

As in a post on the analysis of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) the climates that terrorists and politically violent activists (real radicalized individuals) operate in determine the presence and persistence of terrorist activity. First we have a real definition of radicalization that does not involve demonizing people’s religious faith.  According to Ted Gurr, radicalization refers, roughly, to “a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of social or political goals but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective” (87). From here, some in the group begin to experiment with terrorist attacks and then the choice is made toward justification from the original goals. Reactionary terrorism occurs when a group takes up terrorism in a response to social change. The use of violence become legitimized (87).  Terrorism, according to Martha Crenshaw, that is carefully calculated can put an issue on the public agenda (1998 16, 17) and Gurr states that terrorism can be viewed as a rational-choice to the extent that terrorism becomes viewed as servicing the interests of various publics (1998, 102).

The community of support is very important for terrorist cells to last without detection or capture, as is an underground support system. What is also a necessary ingredient for a favorable climate of terrorism are police and/or government indifference and/or support.  To summarize, we will look at these points to describe the favorability for a climate of anti-immigrant/anti-Muslim terrorism in the Netherlands to emerge: 

  1. Extensive ethnic and social divisions exist and the society is said to be atomized and in ethnic conflict.
  2. Terrorism as a rational-choice, which is supported (usually tacit) by the public for the terrorists’ goals:
    a)      Used against hated minority and “enemy” groups (outgroups);
    b)      Easier for terrorists to build a network of support;
  3.  Individuals and groups in larger society feel a challenge to their existence or want social change:
    a)      Legitimate activism to meet goals fails to meet expectations;
    b)      Individuals go through a process of radicalization, whereby frustrations over lack of meeting goals sets in and the use of violence becomes justified and legitimized.
  4. Terrorism in the threat or use of violence intended to spread fear toward its victims and provoke a social reaction and change.
  5. Police and security agency indifference, perhaps support, regarding terrorism against outgroups

 We can visualize the assessment like a cooking pot into which we put our ingredients for a soup.  To measure the climate for the potential for a right wing terrorist threat against the Netherlands to emerge and persist, we will take the above summarized points and put them into these ingredients. This will be done for the ease of data collection and analysis. There are a wide variety of sources, such as Anne Frank House’s extensive assessments on the right wing elements and activities present in the Netherlands. For example, Ingredient One is the ethnic and social divisions that cause Dutch society to be fragmented and atomized, as described in Point One above. Another ingredient (Ingredient Two), will combine Points Two, Three and Four into possible selection of terrorism as a rational choice to address an issue or perceived threat, which leads to radicalization and justification for violence. The indifference of Dutch police and security officials regarding terrorist threats, which allows terrorism to emerge and persist, is Ingredient Three.

 References

Crenshaw, Martha. 1998. The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a strategic choice. In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich, 7-24. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1998. Terrorism in Democracies: Its social and political bases. In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich, 86-102. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press

Lechner, Frank J. 2008. The Netherlands. Globalization and National Identity. New York: Routledge.

Warlaw, Grant. 1989. Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics and counter-measures. New York: Cambridge University Press.

HyvesBlogger PostShare