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ABSTRACT OF THE STUDY

The EU's Europeanization as a Security Policy.
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The purpose of this research is to discover and explain the security aspects of the European Union's relationships in the post-Cold War world. This study uses variations of social constructivist-based theory to explain Europeanization. Europeanization is a socialization process connected to European Union membership and association. This study uses an applied method developed by Roy Ginsberg that measures the relationship of a target actor to the European Union during an international crisis. It has been found that close association and membership aspirations enhance security and stability in the European Union's relationships with target actors thereby bringing about quick resolutions to international crisis. The European Union is an effective security actor and Europeanization is an effective security policy tool.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Amnesty International
CSFP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Community
EFP	European Foreign Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RF	Russian Federation
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
UN	United Nations

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, East European nations sought membership in the European Community (Union) just as Germany, the “special case,” received its membership thought post-Cold War unification. The former, Soviet nations are EU Member States, after going through the extensive rearrangement of their national policies and customs. Old ways of doing things evaporated, along with borders and national currencies. What was adopted by candidate nations were European norms and values that served as part of what is called *Europeanization*. Europeanization is also a part of relationships with non-members and non-candidates as the European Union often imposes its norms, values, and standards in relationships. Mark Leonard and Richard Gowan described the goal as “transformation of former, Soviet bloc nations into well-governed, democracies” (2004, 7).

The European Union’s obsession with legality is usually taken as a terminal sign of weakness. In fact, it could form part of a power political strategy of ‘passive aggression’ if Europe...backs it with tougher political action. The 80,000 pages of laws the EU has developed since the common market formed in 1957, influencing everything from genetic labeling to human rights, have allowed Europe to ‘syndicate’ its legislation and values across the world – from Russia to Rwanda. It does this by making access to its market conditional on compliance with its mores (2004, 10).

Robert Schuman stated in his famous declaration that “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts through proportionate to the dangers which threaten it” ([1950] 1998, 13). This paper will seek test the ideas that Europeanization is a useful form of security policy and that the exportation of European values can aid in stability and security, especially when the *target actor*, the nation that the European Union has a relationship with, is in a security crisis. What may be a contributing factor, or intervening variable, is the

commitment to EU membership on the part of the target actor. If the European Union has a powerful influence on other actors' behavior in its relationships through Europeanization, this could be a non-military method to achieve security and global integration. What is the European Union's role as an international security actor since the end of the Cold War?

To study the understudied process of Europeanization, applied instruments were developed for this study, chiefly an instrument called the "Monkey Wrench" test. This test is based upon a model developed by Roy Ginsberg that measures the presence of the European Union in international crisis. Researchers that study Europeanization often use the aid of observations gained through personal interviews and review of speeches and documents. However, we can see more about Europeanization of a target actor in the presence of a crisis, a "monkey wrench," to test how the target actor reacts to a crisis and its relation to the European Union. Such a situation can also demonstrate the degree of Europeanization and the European Union's own presence in the crisis of the target actor. There are EU reactions for member states and non-member states that are involved in a crisis and behaviors that are deemed appropriate for the target actor that is involved in a crisis.

Chapter Two

LITERATURE REVIEW

Definition and concepts of “values,” “norms,” and “identity.”

Norms define and constitute identities or prescribe and regulate behaviors for existing identities in various settings and contexts. A norm, according to Frank Schimmelfennig (2003), is a demonstration of desired behavior that is interrelated with identity. For Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein (1996) “norms” are “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity.” Norms can either be “constitutive,” in that norms are used to define identities, or “regulative” of behavior for constituted identities and actors. Together, norms define the actors and their expected behavior in various environments. The institution of sovereignty reproduces state identities and regulates state behavior in the practice of recognition, nonintervention and self-determination. These expressions of norms are found in international law and global agreements on how states should operate (53, 54, 46).

In Russian-European Union discourse, Finnish researcher Hiski Haukkala (2005) described European values and norms as “higher order normative principles that relate to the very foundation and existence of the relationship” (9). Norms also matter at the domestic level in that they are used to shape institutional and cultural elements that shape state identity. The concept of “identity” involves the individuality and “selfhood” projected by an actor that forms as distinctive from “others.” A target actor's “identity” shapes the target actor's interests and policy. “Actorhood” is the basic identity of states or international institutions, which are made up of domestic and cultural features that shape this identity (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, 43, 59, 53, 58; Schimmelfennig 2003, 71).

Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the study of domestic politics in state identities can also be used to study international organizations, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The nations that are members of NATO are liberal democracies that bring to the alliance relationship norms of mutual sympathy and social identification. Norms for the alliance relationship reflect the values of liberal democracies based on mutual decision-making among equals and consensus building through regular consultation. Common meanings and a common language are the basis of a community. The common language is about a social reality, and the “common understanding of certain norms” which are the “common reference in the world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings.” A “value” is a desirable idea and characteristic of an identity that shape the social order that actors within the identity pursue. Values are implied by the identity to be what drive the political goals of the identity. International institutions are fundamental agents that present constraints and opportunities for member states. This describes a security community, a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain “a dependable expectation of reasonable change.” At the heart of the security community is communication that cements social and political communities (Risse-Kappen 1996, 366, 369, 365; Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin 2001, 102; Schimmelfennig 2003, 71; Adler and Barnett 1998, 30, 31).

By showing others through cooperation acts that one expects them to be cooperators too, one changes the intersubjective knowledge in terms of which their identities are defined.

Thus, by engaging in cooperative behavior, an actor will change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new identity for itself (Alexander Wendt 1994, 390).

“Showing others,” as stated by Wendt, involves a communicative process that occurs through discourse and dialog. The main question that Dirk Nabers (2002) addressed in his work on European enlargement is the form of pressures that lead to communicative processes and how

self interested actors come to consider the interests of others. For his study the of EU's relations with an Asian, regional organization, Nabers framework included Wendt's idea that a common fate helps facilitate communication and this communication occurs in institutional contexts. The resulting discourses help to build trust and confidence that are fundamental to international institution-building and collective identity building. "Once discourses achieve dominance they become cloaked in normalcy" (4, 5, 6).

In the Russian-European Union discourse, Finnish researcher Hiski Haukkala (2005) describes European values and norms as "higher order normative principles that relate to the very foundation and existence of the relationship" (9). Norms also matter at the domestic level in that they are used to shape institutional and cultural elements that shape state identity. The concept of "identity" involves the individuality and "selfhood" projected by an actor and formed as distinctive from "others." Identities are then enacted and projected in national security interests that interact and provide a crucial link with environmental structures. A target actor's "identity" shapes the target actor's interests and policy. "Actorhood" is the basic identity of a state or international institution, which is made up of domestic and cultural features that shape actor identity (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, 43, 59, 53, 58; Schimmelfennig 2003, 71).

Conceptualizing Europeanization and a study framework

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) uses an approach called *seminar diplomacy*, or meetings of diplomats, civil servants, experts, that socially construct shared values through regional, political dialogue and agreements. The seminar diplomacy approach was used by the OSCE after 1992 to socialize the successor states of the Soviet Union

by allowing them to be members of the OSCE community in an effort to teach them the norms that are expected of OSCE members. There was an agreement between the OSCE and the new member states that was politically binding and builds mutual trust that was intended to change political practices and insure community building of the new member states (Adler 1998 138-39, 133, 137). New member states were taken in on a “conditional membership” and “taught the rules” that are desirable for OSCE member states (Schimmelfennig 2003, 73, 74). The process of the OSCE's seminar diplomacy of that brings a candidate state “closer” to the European Union is often called “*Europeanization*.” Europeanization has been used as a form of conflict resolution through the European Union's use of carrots and sticks that are not only aimed to produce a lasting settlement, but aimed at changing identities. Europeanization is a process where the outcome is a certain level of integration into European structures (Noutch, Tocci and Coppieters, et al 2004 7, 8).

There are several definitions for Europeanization, according to Reuben Wong (2005), but, generally, the term means “the political and policy changes caused by the impact of membership in the European Union on member states” (135). *National adaptation* refers to the top-down approach by states where “Europe,” or the EU, becomes more relevant and a point of reference for national policies. *Modernization* refers chiefly to the post-Soviet nations that make political, economic and social modernizations that are set into motion by prospective European Union membership. *Policy isophormism* is connected with Europeanization that takes the form of convergence, adaptation and socialization in substantial policy areas. When the target state begins to emulate EU Member States, this is referred to as “indirect” policy learning process and referred to as “direct” when the target state passes regulation authority to the European Union. A conception of Europeanization that closely follows rational-choice theories is the *National*

Projection model, whereby the state exports domestic and national policy preferences, ideas and models to European level. Wong suggests that early, French preference for the shaping of the coal and steel community followed this model of Europeanization (135-141).

Identity Reconstruction relates to Europeanization that reconstructs identities of states and leaders that are interacting with European institutions. Wong describes this conception as a “teleological movement,” when the citizens of member states shift some loyalties to “European” objectives. Europeanization of this type seeks to blend national and federal impulses to create a transnational cultural “Europe” with some supranational characteristics. Socialization of political leaders to “think European” and their prolonged participation in CSFP have some feedback to the member states and reorients national policies “toward Europe” (138). The Center for European Policy Studies defines Europeanization as “the cultural, legal, institutional and economic impact of European integration on domestic structures” (2003, 1).

The concept of Europeanization in the context of conflicts is also an important consideration for this paper. According to Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci and Bruno Coppieters (2004), Europeanization is a process whereby “European rules, mechanisms and collective understandings interact with domestic structures” that should be taken to mean “marked by interrelationships between the layers constituting the European multi-level governance.” The levels often targeted by Europeanization in domestic structure are legal and administrative institutions, social and security policies. Conditional and socialization mechanisms are deployed, along with rewards and punishments in which the EU is both a framework and an active player in the push for a conflict settlement. This process of Europeanization is said by the authors to affect member states that both shape and play in the process. Finally, Europeanization is a foreign policy instrument of the European Union (6-8).

Boyka Stefanova argued that the European Union has two main security roles. The first role is its collective, common foreign and security role and the second is its internal security role of enlargement toward Eastern Europe (2005, 51). For non-member states, or those nations that cannot become European Union members, the exclusive strategy consists of socialization from the outside. A mixed form of association is an arrangement where an outsider state is taught the community's norms and values as a test of its association (Schimmelfennig 2003, 74-75). Stefanova also concluded that EU enlargement has become an important, internal security tool of geographical expansion. This important security tool of geographical expansion will eventually expand to the Balkans nations. The CSFP is, argued Stefanova, the EU's "external anchor," with enlargement as the "most important security-producing process taking place inside of Europe today" (2001, 51-52).

Karen Smith informs us that after the events of November 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, there was no question about the inclusion of East Germany into the Community. East Germany was regarded as a "special case" and swept into the Community in a unified Germany. The example of East Germany's "special case" brought other former Soviet bloc countries knocking at the door for membership. The Community promised that they could eventually become members, but the short-term solution was to give out "Europe agreements," or EAs (2004, 85, 83). Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005) wrote that the EAs did not establish a link to future membership of the EU as membership was viewed as a separate issue (425, 410). A "major aim" of the policy is to "support and encouragement...of free, open and democratic societies in which the full enjoyment of human rights is guaranteed by the rule of law" (2005, 92).

EU enlargement is important for the regime known as *acquis communautaire* (or just *acquis*), as it has implications for Europeanization. In reference to Eastern enlargement,

Sedelmeier simply referred to Europeanization as “alignment with EU legislation” (414).

Michael Baun (2000) defined *acquis* as “the EU's ever-expanding body of rules, regulations, and standards-with only limited derogations transitional arrangements permitted” (4). In his work on tracing the meaning of the *acquis*, Knud Erik Jørgensen (1999) found that the regime is a constitutional order that dates back to the 1960s and was used for the first enlargement to include the accession process of the United Kingdom. Jørgensen believed that there are several different policies to the *acquis* and that the policies have been reproduced, mutated and expanded since the 1960s (15-17).

A concept that is useful for this paper crosses the external relationship of the EU to third countries and non-candidates, as presented by Roy Ginsberg. The EU and its Member States, including candidate countries, are obligated to uphold the “body of existing documents, actions, and external relationships of the EC, the *acquis communautaire*,” and “the body of agreements, actions and procedures of the CSFP” that are referred to as the *acquis politique* (2001, 10).

Conditional association agreements are instruments that are intended to begin the change in domestic and national policies. The second generation of association agreements, tailored to each country, allows access to the free trade area and generous financial aid. However, participating nations must demonstrate commitment to the five conditions: the rule of law, human rights, a multiparty system, free and fair elections, and a market economy. These agreements provide frameworks to integrate associate countries into the Community, the European Union, and to bring the target actors' legislation progressively to the *acquis communautaire*, or the body of EU Treaties, laws and regulations (Noutch, Tocci and Coppieters 2004, 5; Smith 2004, 92-93, 99, 102). According to Nadezhda Arbatova (2006), association agreements are set to a time frame that brings about a reduction in national customs, duties, and

national convergence of policies for EU membership accession. The other integration-oriented agreements include the European Agreement for central and East European states, the European-Mediterranean Agreement, and the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which are aimed at the Balkans states, including Serbia (46, 45).

Jørgensen's research into the meaning and origins of the “take it or leave it” *acquis* led to a focus on the “constitutional” aspects explored by Carlo Curti Gialdino as interpreted by the European Court of Justice. After reading through numerous documents in the hunt to trace the meaning and origins of the *acquis*, Jørgensen came to one conclusion that:

[T]he acceptance and adaptation of the *acquis* is a very important part of what transforms modern European nation-states into post-modern EU Member States...the *acquis* is nothing less than among the defining features of post modern statehood (1999, 22).

Several authors bridge the gap between Europeanization, the *acquis* and third countries. Othon Anastasakis (2005) wrote that “Europeanization South Eastern European Style” is “a demanding, coercive process externally driven by the EU” and that the EU is the center of the process. For the Balkans, Europeanization means adjustment and adoption of western models of security and overcoming traumatic, post-communist nationalism. As discussed by Noutch, Tocci and Coppieters, *conditionality* is linked to special conditions in peace accords that are to be met to obtain financial aid and European integration. This conditionality is also tied to cooperation with the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and non-compliance can result in a loss of financial aid and European integration progress (77, 80, 83).

Abiding by the ICTY rules is a significant part of the normative side of Europeanization for these countries and signifies justice, recognition of past crimes, and reconciliation between neighboring states and ethnic communities. As a result, the EU's power to determine the course of bilateral relations with candidate countries is unrestricted. The EU uses a combination of carrots, sticks, and the promise of eventual membership to bring these countries closer to Europe.

The post-communist transformation was an opportunity for the EU to reassert democratic values, political, and moral principles in otherwise very technical agreements with target actors. Likewise, the introduction of police and military forces and the strengthening of the common foreign and security pillar are out of the perceived need to address security concerns in the former Yugoslav territory (83). Here, Anastasakis argues that Europeanization for Balkans countries is a socialization process and one in which democratic values, including hard security concerns, are part of a full package of engagement.

In their paper on the process of Europeanization in the EU's Neighborhood Policy (a policy set toward nations just outside of the EU's borders), Amy Verdun and Gabriela Chira (2009) demonstrated that the conditionality of "carrots and sticks" in partnership agreements are the first step toward membership. Europeanization is a part of the process. However, aid that flows to Eastern European countries often results in short term window dressing from the recipients in an effort to obtain even more aid. The authors recommended that, as far as security from disruptions of oil supplies from Russia, the EU should try to promote global governance based on cooperative solidarity between the former Soviet states and Russia. In their argument of "energy rather than arms," the authors argued that multilevel governance should be the mechanism to achieve cooperative solidarity (14, 16, 15).

Jeffery Checkel argued that social learning that is a part of Europeanization is more open in an environment where contact is long, sustained and intense. The "long, sustained, and intense" contact environment could be a crisis circumstance. Indeed, Checkel further argues that this social environment, which can lead to socialization and identity-changing contacts, is more open in a time of crisis and policy failure (2005, 810-811; 2001, 53-54). Checkel touts his model as a bridge between institutions and target actors through the examination of the socialization

mechanisms that lead state agents to internalize new roles and community norms. Checkel further argues that socialization begins when individuals take on social roles for the simple reason that they are socially easy. There is a shift from the logic of consequences and instrumental calculations (Type I socialization) to the logic of appropriateness (Type II socialization) as roles are adopted for various group environments (2005, 802, 804, 810).

For a 2006 study on the Europeanization of Serbia's governmental institutions, Jadranka Jelinèæ bridged the gap between Europeanization and identity formation. Jelinèæ's conceptualization of Europeanization is a process with two facets, identity change and formal relations. The first facet is that changes in the target actor's identity is a process of incorporating European values, standards and norms within the domestic public policies, legal norms and conduct. The second facet is that the negotiation process takes place in formal relations between the European Union and Serbia, which start with the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and concludes with Serbia's membership in the European Union. The process of Europeanization is the only option, according to Jelinèæ, for Serbia to incorporate European values, standards, and norms into its social, economic, political, and legal space as “an expression of the responsibility” to join the European Union (6).

Chapter Three

RESEARCH DESIGN

What is the European Union's role as an international security actor since the end of the Cold War? To answer this question, there are three proposed hypotheses that look at the security aspects of Europeanization. The first hypothesis to be tested is the assertion that “*Europeanization as a useful form of security policy.*” The second hypothesis tests the relationship of the target actor to a security community, such as the European Union. We should see that “*drawing closer relationships to a security community help to bring about more peaceful and quicker resolutions to crisis.*” The primary purpose of the Monkey Wrench test is to test this second hypothesis, based on Jeffery Checkel's assertion that numerous and intense contacts between actors in the context of a crisis can open up further cooperation and social learning for the target actor. The third hypothesis is “*part of the common foreign and security policy function is to export values and norms that are shared in the European Union as a form of global integration.*” To test this hypothesis, there will be a look at the target actor, Russia, which has declared that it has no intention to seek European Union membership. Debates and discussions do take place in Russia about the place, role and future of the country in relation to “Europe,” the European Union, and the wider world.

Data collection

It is common for researchers into the EU's relations with other international actors to access several data streams for their studies, chiefly newspaper coverage, confirmed though face-to-face interviews. For her book, *Endgame in the Balkans* (2006), Elizabeth Pond used both newspaper and media reports coupled with interviews of government and organizations officials. Roy Ginsberg (2001) also used interviews of government and international organization officials for

his inquiry into the EU as an international actor. Most authors often do not check data from conferences and policy papers, as interviews and surveys are viewed as the most reliable forms of data.

There will be three sources of primary data for this study: news reports, NGO and governmental documents. Since interviews are not available, this study will draw on news sources, as well as policy papers and studies, governmental reports, and partnership agreements from "open" Internet sources and "closed" sources such as JSTOR. The main elements of the of the *acquis communautaire* are the primary sources of data for this evaluation of what composes European norms, laws, rules and values that are part of the process of Europeanization. This data source consists of the EU's treaties, partnership and association agreements, declarations, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia. NGO reports are an important data source as evidence of Europeanization. Secondary sources of data include journal articles, conference reports, and news media reports and publications. Data harvesting will be limited to five policy areas: crisis management and conflict resolution, international crime and police cooperation, terrorism, human rights and "democracy."

Analysis - Measuring "Europeanization"

This study will employ much of the framework presented by Roy Ginsberg (2001), who studied the impact of the European Union and its policies on other actors in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and the United States. Ginsberg's study sought to describe the degree of impact that the European Union had on target actors based on what the EU "is," the cognitive, political impact, or "anticipatory influence," or what the EU "is" and could become in relations with target actors (52-53). For example, after the perceived loss of Kosovo last year, Serbia did not engage in the old habits of the Milosevic era and after violent riots in Belgrade in which

embassies of the United States and EU Member States were attacked and burned, angry statements from the EU caused the Serbian Government to provide additional security to embassies (Dan Bilefsky 2008).

There are three common methods to check internal validity. Internal validity will be checked through the use of triangulation. Each piece of information will be presented with three sources, with emphasis on EU, governmental and NGO reports and publications. Another source of internal validity will be through the use of two different methods of analysis: congruence and process tracing methods. The “essential characteristic” of the congruence method, according to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005), is where “the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case” (182). The investigator views the value of the independent variables and then predicts what the outcome of the dependent variable should be according to theory. An outcome of the dependent variable that is consistent with theory, the investigator can consider causal connections that are consistent with the theory's prediction (182).

The theory of Europeanization, as developed here, holds that Russia and Serbia should both change their identities and policies to reflect those desired by the European Union. Since the European Union places value on certain internationally recognized norms, such as the peaceful resolution of disputes, we should expect target actors that are Europeanized to select peaceful resolutions of disputes as the preferred way of dealing with conflicts and crisis. In a policy area, such as border and immigration control (under international crime) we should be able to view the degree of cooperation between the target actor and the European Union. Membership aspirations of the target actor are an intervening variable to the amount of Europeanization and membership aspirations must be a part of the analysis.

The effects of European Foreign Policy (EFP) actions and activities on outsiders are measured through both cognitive and empirical political impacts. Output impact is measured through subjective means based on perceptions of nonmember governments, nongovernmental organizations, press reports, public opinion, and think tank reports. In the absence of concrete information, cognitive impact is also informed by counterfactual reasoning, or a technique where the researcher draws cause and effect conclusions due to lack of ability to perform controlled experiments, and put into use when the external-political impact is confirmed. Empirical-political impact is based on data from interviews, government documents, treaties and agreements (51, 55). This data collection method, discussed above, will be applied to an adapted model that is based on Ginsberg's model discussed above.

The first data analysis method will be the process-tracing method. Process-tracing, according to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005), “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanisms—between the independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (206). The authors contend that the method is an “indispensable tool” for theory testing and theory development, which generates numerous observations that require explanations (207). Jeffrey Checkel (2005) described process tracing as a careful mapping of the process, with the aim of viewing the causal mechanisms to explore the theoretically derived expectations about the workings of these mechanisms. The use of the “monkey wrench” is a visual aid that will map out and view the workings of Europeanization on the target actor in a crisis situation. We can view reports from NGOs, governmental entities, and the target actor's plans and statements that demonstrate Europeanization, but a crisis, a “monkey wrench,” allows for a full test of both Europeanization and external validity. The results of the process tracing and analysis will be used to classify the

political impact of the European Union according to the classifications of Ginsberg's model (see Table 3.1). According to the Ginsberg model, an output need not have a political impact, but an output that does have a political impact is referred to as an “outcome.” European foreign policy is a set of objectives related to a nonmember state, region or issues area. The implementation of European foreign policy is called an “action.” A common position is a declaration that demonstrates a foreign policy preference (48).

The Monkey Wrench test

Another check of validity is through the use of two target actors, Russia and Serbia. The effects of Europeanization will be measured against the nation that is not seeking EU membership, Russia, compared to the nation that is working hard for EU membership, Serbia. For the Monkey Wrench test, there will be dependence on newspapers, as well as official statements and speeches. A “monkey wrench” into the relationship between the third country and the European Union helps us to see both the effects the EU brings to the relationship and if the target actor responds according to what the EU deems as appropriate responses.

Ginsberg differentiates between what the EU “is,” cognitive-political impact and the instruments, as well as European values and interest, and what the EU “does” is its foreign and security policy activity in various regions of the world that are felt by “outsiders” that can have empirical-political impact. The EU has a “nil” impact when it, acting alone or with other actors, takes an action that does not result in a political impact. A “nil” political impact also occurs when the EU has no influence or chooses not to take action even when it could have according to European treaties and law. A “marginal impact” is felt when the EU, acting alone or with others, has general influence or indirectly influences the domestic, foreign, and/or security policy of a

non-member. The EU is said to have “considerable impact” when, acting alone or with others, has tangible influences on the domestic, foreign and/or security policy of a nonmember state. When the domestic, foreign and/or security policy is directly and primary changed though the EU, acting alone or with other actors, it is a “significant impact” on the nonmember (52-53, 54, 55).

Table 3.1 – Levels of impact of EU’s external political impact based on Ginsberg’s model.

	Level of impact			
	Nil	Marginal	Considerable	Significant
Degree of influence	none	General/indirect	Major beneficial or adverse effects	Major beneficial or adverse effects on vital interests
Quality of influence	none	Beneficial or adverse effects	Major beneficial or adverse effects	Major beneficial or adverse effects on vital interests
Modification of behavior/policy	none	none	yes	yes
Measure of effect of EU action	empirical	Cognitive/empirical	Cognitive/empirical	empirical
Presence	none	yes	yes	yes
Capacity	none	none	yes	yes
Significance	none	none	some	yes

Source: Ginsberg, 53.

- “Nil”- The EU has nil impact when it, acting alone or with other actors, takes, or tries to take, an action that does not succeed as intended, or when it chooses not to act when it could have under its competence of CSFP.
- “Marginal” – According to Ginsberg, the EU has marginal impact when its “action or inaction may have beneficial or adverse impact on non-member (target actor” interests, but does not product a change or modification in the behavior or domestic, foreign, or security policy of a non-member.” Both cognitive and empirical measures point to marginal impact (53).
- “Considerable” – The EU has considerable impact when, acting alone or with others, tangibly influences the domestic, foreign and/or security policy, interests, or behavior of an non-member.
- “Significant” –The EU, when acting alone or with others, is primary and directly responsible for the change in the behavior of domestic, foreign or security policy

of a non-member that would not have occurred in the absence of the EU stimulus (52-54).

This model borrows Ginsberg's coding of outcome impacts, but is directed toward the target actor and its Europeanization in the five international security areas: crisis management and conflict resolution, international crime and police cooperation, terrorism, human rights and “democracy.” This is a measure that includes actor presence and identity. This presence and identity is what the EU “is” and what the EU “does.” Analysis and discussion of events will be charted under the impacts levels after a short discussion of the history and identity of the target actor in the same manner employed by Ginsberg for his analysis of the EU's impact upon the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the United States.

Table 3.2 – Example “Monkey Wrench” model. Adaptation of Ginsberg’s model.

Date	Input or Issue	Output	Outcome	Political Impact	Relative Impact	Measure
Up to Feb. 14	Prospect of Kosovar independence and prospect of violence and instability	Discouraged unilateral declaration by Kosovars and offered resolution w/ other international actors - feared violence	Serbia maintains that it opposes Kosovar independence	nil	US, Russia, UN	cognitive

Chapter Four

SERBIA

Serbia's past and relevance of Kosovo

Victor Roudometof (2001) writes that the Balkans ethnic identities became associated with class stratification, social mobility and the social divisions of labor. For the Serbs, the preservation of Serbian, cultural identity is the source of their collective ethnic and religious identity today. Important also was the 1847 reshaping of the Kosovo event to include nationalist elements by Prince Njegos. Roudometof traces the Battle of Kosovo and gives treatment to the 1847 changes that bring the battle into the modern day. However, there is little connection made to the relevance of the Kosovo story to the Balkans' conflicts and modern Serbian politics. The view as to why Kosovo is important to Serbs is very relevant to the modern day's conflicts and collective identity of Serbia.

Raju G.C. Thomas and H. Richard Friman (1999) do believe that the historical narrative that most Serbs believe is relevant today and the authors establish this connection through religious identity. Religious identity as a member of the Serbian Orthodox Church is highly important for individual Serbian identity. Thomas and Friman state that the religious orientation determines if a person is a Serb, Croat or Muslim. Serbs are exclusively Orthodox Christian and belong to the Serbian Church, whereas Croats are almost exclusively Roman Catholics. Thomas also gives a good connection of the cultural and historical identity of the Serbs to the Yugoslav conflicts. In their discussion of the role that religion and religious plays in culture, the authors establish connections to the present-day ethnic and national identities that are part of the Balkans conflicts.

According to Roy Ginsberg (2001) the EU was burned in the former Yugoslavia and the US and NATO won the war and secured the final peace. NATO airstrikes ended the war and squared the corners of conflict resolution that were started by the European Community in 1991. Ginsberg reports that the impact of the European Community/Union was greater than what “conventional wisdom” holds. During the conflicts, the European Community contributed to food, medical aid and evacuations of refugees. The EU's failures are missteps of its Member States, such as Germany's rush to recognize Croatia and the push by France and Britain to remove the EU's Carl Bildt and Italy out of the talks on the Contact Group. Germany's recognition of Croatia created deep-seeded mistrust of the EU in Belgrade.

The stated purposes for lifting the sanctions against Yugoslavia in October 2000 by international actors were “the overthrow of the Milosevic regime after the inauguration of the democratically elected President Kostunica.” The EU Council decided lift sanctions on October 9, 2000 and invited the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to participate in the stabilization and association process, expanded reconstruction, and humanitarian programs. The European Union promised to “contribute to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law in the FRY, to the success of the major political, economic and social reforms it will introduce and to its opening up to Europe.” The European Union also hoped that the FRY would establish relations with its neighbors and begin the reconciliation process. Prior to the October 2000 elections, the European Union gave assistance to municipalities that opposed Milosevic in the form of heating oil. Aid to 34 opposition municipalities would include elderly cases, shelter, medicines, food and other help for displaced persons from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Prior to the October 2000 Serbian elections, European Union foreign ministers held out the prospect of closer association

and the lifting of sanctions (Canada 2001; Council of the European Union 2000; The Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Serbia 2009).

Serbia after Milosevic and new “pro-Europe” direction

The International Crisis Group (ICG) report of September 2001 describes Kostunica and his DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia) party as the most popular, due to Kostunica's personal standing. At the time the ICG paper was written, there was a perception that Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was pushing forward economic and social reforms could cause turmoil. The Serbian government avoided educating the public on the reforms that were being undertaken to meet European standards. The Kostunica government was reluctant to challenge the passive and broad, based support (at that time) for Serbian nationalism. After Djindjic delivered Milosevic to the ICTY in the Hague, Netherlands, there would be a split between Kostunica and Djindjic. Djindjic would subsequently be the victim of assassination on 12 March 2003, and this tragic event would be another identity changing crisis for Serbia. The murder of a pro-Europe, pro-West reformer by elements of the past Milosevic regime was a reminder that elements from Serbia's dark past were still a part of the social-political landscape. The European Commission reports commend the memory of Djindjic's drive to build democracy and bring Serbia out of international isolation (International Crisis Group 2001; Stojanovic 2002; Pond 2006; European Commission 2003; European Commission, 2004; European Commission 2005).

Vladimir Matic (2002) wrote about the reforms in Yugoslavia since January 2001 until March of 2002. Matic argued that although slow, there was some progress toward a democratic Serbia. The author concludes that the reforms in Yugoslavia-Serbia should be encouraged by outsiders, but outsiders should not choose sides in country's political games and conflicts.

A pre-election statement from Javier Solana “to the Serbian people” declared that a vote against Milosevic was “a vote for democracy in Serbia” and “a vote for Serbia in Europe.”

Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative, wrote an article on October 12, 2000 in which he declared that Serbia was ready to “leave the dark shadows of oppression behind it and rejoin the family of free European nations.” Shortly after the election of Kostunica, the EU quickly invited the new president to the EU summit in Biarritz and relations between Serbia and the rest of the world, including the ICTY, improved. A main objective of the Serbia-Montenegro government under Vojislav Kostunica was European integration. The European Union had provided policy advice to Serbia-Montenegro since 2001 in the form of the EU-FRY Consultative Task Force (CTF). The CTF was replaced by the Enhanced Permanent Dialogue, which monitors and drives reforms of the European Partnership adapted by the Council of Ministers and the corresponding implementation plan of December 2004 (Pond 2006; Council of the European Union 2003).

We reaffirm that a choice leading to democratic change will entail a radical change in the European Union's policy with regard to Serbia: we will lift the sanctions against the FRY; we will support the necessary economic and political reforms by providing Serbia with economic aid for its reconstruction and we will support the reintegration of the FRY into the international Community. We will suggest to the FRY that it draw closer to the European Union so that it can occupy its rightful place in Europe. We have never forgotten that the Serbs are Europeans (Council of the European Union 2000).

Since the defeat of Milosevic, the country has stated that it would like to integrate into Western democratic institutions, including NATO, as well as the EU. In 2006, Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program even as only a fourth of Serbia's population supported NATO membership. The belief is that this low support for NATO membership is a result of the 1999 action NATO took against the country, according to Steven Woehrel (2008), and

the recognition of Kosovo's independence by most NATO members may have turned more Serbian citizens away from supporting NATO membership. The United States views Serbian membership in Western structures as promotion of a "Europe, whole and free," but Serbia needs to make more advances in its intelligence and military institutions to be a viable NATO member. NATO, like the EU, requires the arrest of all persons wanted by the ICTY to be "full compliance" and necessary condition for membership (4, 5).

On the occasion of a visit to the North Atlantic Council, Vuk Jeremic stated that his nation wants to play a constructive role in consolidating the security architecture of South Eastern Europe. Serbia's Foreign Minister declared that his government wants to move rapidly toward EU membership, but also association with NATO "to work to declaring the benefits of PfP (Partnership for Peace) membership to the citizens of our country and our region" (Republic of Serbia 2007, 2). Vuk Jeremic expressed the desire of his country to contribute to stability and security of the region:

I believe that without this twin perspective emanating out of Brussels, the incentives to reform and cooperate in our part of the world could be dramatically diminished. The western Balkans could return to division and strife-and hatred, and conflict, and terrible misery. Stability would not take root, and prosperity would remain illusive.

A crucial component in building an undivided Europe is reconciliation. Democracy cannot flourish without a full and open account of the past. That is why the Republic of Serbia is strongly committed to full and immediate cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia. The few indictees still at-large must be located, arrested, and handed over to the Hague (Republic of Serbia 2007, 2, 4).

The message is mixed for Serbia and its involvement in regional security cooperation and counter-terrorism. According to NATO's Science for Peace and Security webpage, Serbia has been involved in 14 programs with the Alliance since 2007. One such project involves the exchange of scientists in the field of earthquakes and geology that will aid in monitoring

seismographic activity in the region and another project in the research and reconstruction of high speed data transitions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2009).

In 2005, Serbia implemented a new Law on Police to build professionalism and transparency of its police forces toward democratic standards. The report suggested that Serbia learn to work more with EUROPOL (European Police Office) on strategic assessments and contributions to European organized crime threat assessment reports. At the time, there was still a need for Serbia to implement EU standards in the area of cooperation and coordination between law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary, both on local and regional levels. The 2005 report demonstrated concerns that the Serbian Constitution lacks objective standards in the selection, appointment, and dismissal of judges and prosecutors without regard for political preference (37-38, 6).

Countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction is in Serbia's Stabilization and Association Agreement and commits the country to combat WMDs, their transit, exports, related goods and technologies. Article Six requires that Serbia maintains good neighborly relations in order to contribute to regional stability and cooperation in international, criminal counter measures with its neighbors. Article 10 commits Serbia to full integration of into the family of democratic nations and gradual rapprochement with the European Union. The “convergence on issues” means “common views on security and stability in Europe, including cooperation in areas covered by CSFP.” The Serbian ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and interior strengthen their CSFP integration and institution building through study trips and seminars to get to know how CSFP institutions operate (Serbian Government date unknown, 13; Council of the European Union 2003, 31; Republic of Serbia 2008, 824).

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, according to the European Commission's webpage on enlargement, is to “establish and reinforce peace and security in Southeastern Europe.” The Stability Pact has a focus on democratization and human rights, and was established in 1999 as a project of the European Union. The arguments of the Stability Pact are based on the idea that peace and security are achieved through economic recovery, which will eventually lead to a better future of internal and external security founded in democracy and integration. The Stability Pact also seeks to integrate the Balkans countries into both the European Union and NATO, and is viewed as an important mechanism of EU-US cooperation. The Stability Pact has three working tables that aid in democratization and integration: Table I-Democratization and Human Rights; Table II-Economics and Investments; and Table III-Security, Law Enforcement and Organized Crime (European Commission 2004, Hombach 2004; U.S Department of State 2009).

The SAA and ICTY Cooperation

The European Partnership of June 2004 sets out requirements for European Union compatibility in all areas of governance for both Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. There are the requirements of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo. The first European Partnership of 2004 was replaced with the European Partnership of 30 January 2006 and this instrument's goal was to commit Serbia-Montenegro to an even deeper relationship with “Europe.” The second European Partnership contained a large dose of Justice and Home Affairs, especially related Kosovo (Official Journal of the European Union 2006).

The report on Serbia's progress toward the SAA negotiations from April 2005 stated that Serbia had made significant progress in meeting its obligations in regard to the cooperation with

the ICTY, especially improvement in access to documents and witnesses. Also, human and minority rights had also improved, along with improvements in respect for the freedom of speech. The European Commission declared that Serbia was in a position to assume the obligations resulting from the SAA in the area of the movement of workers, capital, services and goods (Serbian Government date unknown, 13; European Commission 2005).

Both the Serbian people and their Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, realize that part of the game of EU membership is to meet the requirement of “full cooperation” with the ICTY and as a result of this requirement the country is active in arresting those with outstanding warrants. Ahto Lobjakas (2008) wrote in a commentary for Radio Liberty that “the arrival of Radovan Karadzic in The Hague serves an important vindication for the EU.” Lobjakas wrote that the continued cooperation and engagement of the EU in Serbia are partly responsible for the pro-Europe, pro-Western government of Boris Tadic. The best solution for Serbia is the SAA and continuous engagement of the country and its leaders by the EU. After the arrest of Karadzic, announced by President Tadic on July 21, 2008, Javier Solana commented that “this proves that Serbia's government is committed to working with The Hague Tribunal” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008). At a meeting of EU ministers, Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic commented on the arrest of Karadzic and its implication for Serbia’s EU bid:

We want to be a member of the European Union. We want to be a cornerstone of peace. We want to be a regional player for regional stability. We are truly committed to peace and international rule of law, be it when it comes to our cooperation with The Hague tribunal or be it in our defense of our sovereignty over Kosovo (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008).

The arrest Karadzic was warmly received throughout Europe, with the exception of the Netherlands, which remained “deeply traumatized” by the Srebrenica massacres (Lobjakas 2008). The Commission's website reports that Serbia signed the SAA and the Interim Agreement

on Trade and Trade Related Issues on 29 April 2008. In the SAA, Serbia is “to foster cooperation and good neighborly relations with other countries in the region.” The signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement requires regional cooperation with neighbors that also have signed such agreements. (European Commission 2008, 3, 17; Serbian Government The EU Integration Office date unknown, 21). A July 7, 2008 opinion by the Committee of the Regions welcomed reforms that Serbia had made in public administration, judicial reforms, anti-corruption and rights for ethnic minorities (Official Journal of the European Union. 2008).

A November 2008 report from the Commission declared that Serbia was a “potential candidate for EU membership” because it had previously been stated that it was:

[A] stable and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is important for the stability of the region. In this regard, it encouraged Serbia to meet the necessary conditions to allow its Stabilisation and Association Agreement rapidly to be signed and, in the light of Serbia's considerable institutional capacity, and recalling its conclusions of December 2006, reiterated its confidence that progress on the road towards the EU, including candidate status, can be accelerated (European Commission 2008, 4-5).

The Stabilization and Association process was launched as the EU's long-term commitment to a contractual relationship that gradually moves the target nation closer to EU standards and concludes with membership in the European Union. According to Barbara Posch (2009), the task to integrate the Balkans into the European Union is one of the European Union's most significant foreign policy statements (7).

The Serbian Public and EU membership

Marko Stojic (2006), in his work on euroskepticism in Croatia and Serbia argued that a large part of what fuels anti-EU sentiment in the two nations is the extra ICTY cooperation requirement. This, argues Stojic, fuels the feelings of injustice and double standards, as quick EU integration,

especially in Croatia, is viewed as an aid to ease a painful transition to the post Cold War world. There is a feeling of mistrust among Balkans people and suspicions about the intentions of others. This feeling caused both nations to lose a decade of economic development. High poverty rates compound the anti-EU sentiments among Croatian and Serbian citizens who grow impatient for a “better European future” (317-316).

The Serbian Government engages in annual, public surveys on its citizens' EU membership views that yields a different set of findings from those of Stojic. In 2006 most Serbian citizens, almost 70%, would vote “yes” in a referendum on their country joining the European Union. When asked the question: “*Do you personally feel as a European citizen?*” the response was 42.6% “Yes” and 37.0% “No” to the European citizen sentiment. Most Serbian citizens, 42.4%, felt like citizens of Serbia more than citizens of five other categories and almost the same percentage were not informed about their country's EU aspirations. When asked what European values the EU supports, the top three answers were freedom of movement, open market and democracy, and human rights for ethnic minorities was in fourth place. Most respondents' attitude toward their country's membership agreed that “it would be natural” for Serbia to be in the EU (68%) and “more members make the EU stronger in the world” (64%). The respondents, however, are split on their country's efforts to become an EU member (31% disagree/33% agree). “More member countries leads to peace and security in Europe,” with 62% in agreement while 18% disagreed (Republic of Serbia 2006). For the release of its December 2008 survey-report, the Serbian Government showed results of the surveys for several years, back to December 2002. One question asked: “Do you support the accession of our country to the EU?” The results of this question for a “yes” response have never dropped below 61% support among the Serbian public. It should be pointed out that the lowest percentage support for

Serbian EU membership, 61%, which occurred in the last December 2008 survey, with the highest level of support for Serbian EU membership, 78%, occurring in the April 2004 survey (Republic of Serbia 2008).

There are consistencies in all of the annual surveys. The first is the younger populations are viewed as the ones to benefit from Serbia's EU membership in terms of a better future. Also, the younger populations have the highest percentage that favor EU membership for Serbia. The 18-29 year-olds respondents believe that visa free travel is important. This is also the age category with the highest percentage that would vote for “yes” for EU accession. Youth policy, social policy, and consumer protection matter the most to these respondents, while common foreign and security policy rank last out of 10 possible choices (Republic of Serbia 2008).

What is noteworthy about the survey of Serbian citizens and their country's EU membership prospects are related to perceptions of how fair the EU is treating Serbia. Both surveys indicate that the majority of the respondents are uninformed about their country's association with the EU. However, the respondents are not totally uninformed as 83% understand that cooperation with the ICTY is a precondition for Serbia's membership aspirations. The respondents, 47%, find the ICTY requirement acceptable, as compared to 47% “no” and 10% “don't know.” There is a feeling, 62%, that the EU imposes new conditions on Serbia's accession requirements (Republic of Serbia 2008).

The Kosovo Independence Monkey Wrench

According to Barbara Posch (2009), the Kosovo independence crisis caused a diplomatic rift between Serbia and the EU Member States that recognized Kosovo, but this diplomatic rift has

worked itself out (8). The 2008 Commission report to the European Parliament states that relations over Kosovo's independence strained relations between the European Union and Serbia, especially following the violence in Belgrade. As stated by Serbian officials, the country has vowed restraint and intends to seek peaceful means and legal remedies to contest the Kosovo declaration. Following the July seating of Parliament, the Government laid out an agenda for its office, chiefly European integration, the fight against crime and corruption, the observance of international law, and “to undertake all legal and diplomatic measures so as to preserve Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of Serbia” (European Commission 2008, 5, 8).

In November 2007, the European Union appeared to be discouraging the pending independence push among the Kosovar Albanian majority, putting forth the argument that Pristina should wait for a Kosovo-status solution that is coordinated with the international community. There was a general fear from EU foreign ministers that secession would encourage other such movements in Europe. The other fear of EU diplomats was that a unilateral declaration would be “quite bad” and that there would be “a certain explosiveness in this region.” EU diplomats felt that any declaration should also be coordinated with Washington and Brussels to “prevent a political vacuum that could allow violence on both sides to erupt.” The view that violence could erupt in the region was a “grave concern” and caused European defense ministers to agree to maintain a force of 2,500 troops in Bosnia among the Serb, Muslim and Croat factions. The Kosovars wanted nothing less than independence from Belgrade, not “broad autonomy,” and remain ruled by Belgrade (Ringstrom 2007; Bilefsky 2007, Mark John 2007).

Serbia rejected the United Nations' Ahtisaari Plan, named after the creator, Finnish UN diplomat Martti Ahtisaari, because it would give what Reuters' reporter Matt Robinson

described as “independence supervised by the European Union.” Serbia claimed that it was defending its sovereignty and rejected those portions that violated its territorial integrity. Any impression that President Tadic was discussing independence for Kosovo would cause a stir in volatile Serbia. The goal was to adopt a deal which would be good for Kosovo and good for Serbia while preserving the peace, with all “holding their heads up high” (Matt Robinson 2007; Boris Groendahl and Alexandra Zawadil 2007; Beti Bilandzic 2007).

On February 14, 2008, the Kosovo Parliament approved a declaration of independence by a show of hands. Prime Minister Hashim Thaci stated that his government approved of the Ahtisaari Plan, which envisions a “new Kosovo” without discriminations against minorities. The first call by President Tadic was that Serbia's reaction should not deteriorate relations with the EU, but that in the EU is the right place for Serbia to fight for its interests. However, some in the Serbian government, like Slobodan Samardžic, Minister for Kosovo Affairs, along side of Kostunica, blamed both the EU and the US for the rioting in Belgrade and Kosovo. Both nationalists called for a reexamination of Serbia's relationship with the EU and advocated a closer relationship with Moscow. The nationalist, Radical Party blamed President Tadic and his government for the “catastrophic, diplomatic situation” of the “27 EU Member States stealing a part of Serbian territory.” Just a week earlier the EU offered a “political cooperation agreement” which would have improved political dialogue, free trade, visa free travel and cooperation in education. There was no mention of Kosovo in this agreement. However, the EU had to postpone the deal due to what it claimed was obstruction by Kostunica and the Radicals, who called the deal a “deception” to coax Serbia into acceptance of both Kosovo independence. The prime minister and the nationalists had linked Kosovo independence with Serbia's EU relations while

Tadic's pro-western government saw no links and promoted the idea that Kosovo is best fought for in the EU (B92 2008; Vesna Peric Zimonjic 2008; Barber 2008).

Various people and nations blamed Serbia, especially individual leaders, for violent acts that followed the Kosovo independence declaration. The violence in the Northern Kosovo town of Kosovska Mitrovica occurred when Serb rioters threw firecrackers and bottles at UN police forces. Violence in Kosovo was blamed on various Serbian officials, according to largely Western media, but Western-leaning, Serbian officials blamed the violence on various nationalist politicians for fanning the flames as rioters also attacked the office of the Liberal Democratic Party. However, rioters burned the U.S. Embassy and one person died in the fire. The U.S. blamed Serbian leaders for the burning of its embassy and the violent attacks against others embassies, and pointed out that Serbian authorities had an obligation to protect embassies. President Tadic stated that he “condemned the violence in the strongest possible terms,” but Javier Solana stated the violence was also damaging Serbia's standing in the EU and froze talks on the SAA. After the EU froze out Serbia from talks on the SAA, Serbian police arrested over 200 rioters. The unrest and riots injured 150 people, many of them police officers, and police arrested 200 people involved in the riots. Prosecutors were “looking for the culprits” who had attacked and burned the U.S. embassy (Peter Beaumont 2008; CTV 2008; David Vujanovic 2008; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008; Stephen Castle and Dan Bilefsky, 2008; Dan Bilefsky 2008).

The Serbian Parliament, dissolved from infighting, after becoming polarized by the Kosovo crisis and Serbia's relation to the EU, which was seen as an accomplice to Kosovo's independence. According to The Pontis Foundation, written before the May 11 elections, the choice for Serbian voters was, again, between European integration or living in the past of

injustices and hatreds (2008, 1-3). The nationalists continued to link European integration and the SAA to Kosovo independence in the context of the election debates. There was a fear among European leaders that Serbia would “slip away” and chose to “isolate itself from the EU.” The eventual signing of the SAA was seen as an ingredient in the new “snap” elections and a choice between Serbia past and Serbia future, connected to Kosovo (Ellie Tzortzi 2008; British Broadcasting Company 2008; European Commission 2008, 8). While Kostunica labeled those that signed the SAA as “traitors,” a poll demonstrated a 66 percent support among Serbian citizens for the SAA signing, barring the problems between the EU and Serbia. Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that the SAA between the EU and Serbia should have been signed earlier. According to Lavrov, “so many years have been wasted on discussions on how to deal with Serbia's European prospective” (The Pontis Foundation 2008; B92 2008a; B92 2008b).

Serbia's firm European prospective would be confirmed at the May 11 elections. Boris Tadic's “For a European Serbia” coalition took nearly 40 percent of the parliamentary vote (102 seats) while the Radicals won 77 seats with 29 percent and Kostunica's bloc took 11 percent of the vote and won 30 seats. In July of 2008, a pro-Europe, pro-West government formed and the incoming government prepared an ambitious EU integration agenda, including the fight against crime and corruption, social accountability and observance of international law. The new government's agenda vowed “to undertake all legal and diplomatic measures so as to preserve Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of Serbia” (British Broadcasting Company 2008; European Commission 2008, 8).

Chapter Five

RUSSIA

“Europe” and Europe for the Russians and Soviets

The emergence of New Thinking in the Soviet Union, according to Robert Herman's study of Soviet-Russian policy, was the result of specialist-expert networks that provided the bridge between the new ideas and identities. The framing of Soviet national interests was a political struggle between the competing groups within the Soviet political elite. The conception of idealist thinking into Soviet policy late in Gorbachev's term was by in-system reformers who believed in principles that governed Western democracies and policies (1996, 285, 283). A few authors argue that post-Soviet Russia wanted to integrate into the West and “return to Europe.” The Foreign Ministry subscribed to these ideas, as well as foreign policy intellectuals of the late-Soviet era. Angela Stent (2007) argues that post-USSR, Russia looked for Western help to recreate itself after having renounced its communist identity. Some Westernizers believe that Russia should draw closer to NATO and the West, and even join NATO (417, 419). There are today the “statists,” among them Vladimir Putin, who envision Russia as a great power and as “exceptional Russia” on the world stage (Tsygankov 2006 66, 158).

The focus of many observers of Russian politics is on the Westernizers, but there are also other domestic actors in Russian politics that have made their visions of their country's relations between the West, NATO and the European Union felt (Tsygankov 2006, Makarychev 2006, Stent 2007). Roy Allison (2006) tells us that the view of pragmatic nationalists favored practical, military cooperation with the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), but not the conditionality of the European Union's ESDP. Any cooperation between the EU and Russia must be on Russia's terms, but without the norm convergence that is viewed as contrary to Russian sovereignty.

Pragmatic nationalists expect a clear strategy to protect Russian interests from Chechnya to Kaliningrad. Fundamentalist nationalists believe that ESDP is controlled by NATO, while at the same time they believe that an independent European military potential could threaten Russian interests. Many Russian military officers share the outlook that ESDP might infringe on Russia's zone of influence and interests (76-77).

Andrei Tsygankov (1997) also believes that there are four “schools of thought” for Russian foreign policy thinkers. The first of these four types of policy thinkers are the *International Institutionalists*, who believe that Russia is a “great, normal country” with normal national borders, which seeks international cooperation on issues, and leads a voluntary confederation among many of its former Soviet states based on respect for democracy and sovereignty. The International Institutionalists seek friendly cooperation with the United States and the European Union as Russia's interests are in the West, including participation in NATO. The second are the *Defensive Realists*, who believe in competition with the West, but do not view Western intentions as hostile. The Defensive Realists believe in pragmatic cooperation and gradual reassertion of leadership over the former Soviet states as a measure of security. Defensive Realists believe that Russia is a great power that has its own civilization from which it draws its own values. Defensive Realists believe in cooperation with the West, but there must be equality between the partners in any partnership. Defensive Realists believe that cooperation must be based on common interests, not common values (254, 257, 259, 260).

There are two other schools of policy thinkers that are hostile to the West. The first of these are the *Aggressive Realists* and they see the international system as hostile to Russia's interests. Aggressive Realists argue that no action from the West should be trusted. Aggressive Realists also do not trust China and view China, its rise as an economic and military power, as a

source of potential threat to Russia. The former Soviet states should be reintegrated back into Russia to form a union and put a stop to these former, Soviet states from coming under the influence of outside powers. The second school of policy thinkers is the *Revolutionary Expansionist*. The Revolutionary Expansionists divide the geopolitical landscape into allies and friends of Russia and believe in the use of force to expand into China and the Muslim world. Revolutionary Expansionists believe that the only way to save Russia is to expand and absorb other nations, such as China, India and Muslim world (Tsygankov 1997, 259, 260, 263).

Partnerships between Russia and the European Union

The 1999 Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia was crafted in hopes of Russia's "rightful return to the European family." This document is based on shared values that would be the basis for transform of the Russian state, economy, and society toward the European model. While talking about shared values, Russia under Vladimir Putin has vowed to participate in European affairs as an "equal among equals." The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of December 1997 sets out the same requirements for democracy as it requires for candidate states (Allison 2006, 166-167). Hiski Haukkala's 2005 study indicated that the insistence of European norms and values in the EU's relationship with Russia was hindering the relationship. Haukkala also argues that the existence of norms and shared values in the EU-Russian relationship has the functions of defining the relationship and serve as benchmarks of a future relationship. Norms and values are the "normative core" of the EU-Russian relationship that serves as the "rules of the game" are based on (the assumption of) shared values (6-7). According to observers, Russia's democracy, especially under President Vladimir Putin, has

become “ill-liberal” and fallen short of EU expectations (Allison 2006, Roberts 2007, Haukkala 2005, Gomart 2008).

The Agreement names the normative “rules of the game” largely in the first parts of the document, which include providing an “appropriate framework for the gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe.” “Important historical links” and the “desire of the Community to strengthen those links” were forged with the old Soviet Union. Human rights, the rule of law, democracy, are all main themes, and requirements, of the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Economic integration and activity are instruments to achieve the three goals the of transformation to a market economy, meaningful partnership in a preplanned relationship for economic and political reforms, and acceptance Western values and norms without membership (European Commission 1997; Haukkala 2005 ; Roberts 2007, 31).

The other “rules of the game” are regular meetings that gage the progress toward various goals. There is also a “Cooperation Council.” Title Two of the PCA sets out “a regular, political dialogue” between the Parties, the European Union and Russia, to include two annual meetings. These annual meetings occur between the Council Presidency, the Commission President, and the President of the Russian Federation. This “regular, political dialogue” is intended to create economic convergence that will lead to more intense political relations and convergence views of mutual concern, thus increasing security, stability, and cooperation on matters of democracy and human rights (PCA 1997).

The Common Strategy describes two “clear goals” for Russia in the areas of stability and security. The first is “a stable, open and pluralistic democracy governed by the rule of law.” The second goal is “maintaining European stability and global security” (Journal of the European Communities 1999). Allison argues that the European value of human rights had weakened in

Russia and this observation was not only made by the Commission and the Council, but also the European Parliament in February 2004 (167).

Most authors state that the EU-Russia relationship is often dead locked, or as Thomas Gomart (2008) described, “in a profound depression.” Gomart likens the EU-Russia relationship to a married couple that are “obligated to live together and are contractually bound, the two partners are no longer attracted to each other and are unable to put their relationship in prospective” (1). Cynthia Roberts (2007) believes that mistrust between Russia and Europe still abounds, lacks accountability, even as Russia has special relationships in NATO and the G7 (renamed G8 to include Russia), and is capable of shutting off the gas spigot to Ukraine and Europe over political and price disputes (1-2).

Roberts believes that the “historical struggle” to integrate post-Cold War Russia into Western institutions is senseless as Russia behaves like “a typical monopolist in its energy deals.” Some Russian leaders have a stake in a non-transparent, powerful, Russian state, and some are growing ambivalent about European integration and the imposition of values and norms. Russian preferences are for equal partnerships without conditions attached to “special relationships” and equality without exclusion or conditions. The EU conditions the development of a deep relationship based on Russia's adoption of European norms and values, but according to Roberts, Russia's weak democratic institutions, lack of state accountability and transparency do not hold a promising future such a relationship. As a self sufficient exporter of energy supplies that Europe is dependent on, it is Russia that has leverage and the EU is unlikely to risk confrontation (81, 6, 5).

Roberts asks why the relationship is faltering and answers that Russia is moving away from liberal democracy, epically under President Putin. The least amount of demands was placed

on Russia for its membership in the Council of Europe. Roberts argues that Russia has even been working to undermine the work of human rights organizations (8). As Rolf Schuette (2004) observed about the EU-Russia relationship:

What defines the E.U.'s attitude toward Russia in this respect is the concept of 'common European values.' Even though the E.U. never laid out the 'European' character of these values (as compared with their universal character), it is quite obvious that the E.U., without saying so explicitly, expected or at least hoped for more from Russia...than from partners on other continents. The growing disappointment with President Putin's domestic policies is understandable only against the background of such high expectations. These expectations made the question of 'common values' and Russia's compliance or noncompliance, a vital and constant feature in E.U.–Russia relations (21).

Moving borders and the growing cooperation in security

Various observers argue that the EU-Russia relationship is a needed relationship whatever the form any relationship takes. Enlargement of the EU to Russia's borders drew a list of concerns from Moscow. In the "four common spaces" in the economic matters, research, education and culture, there are opportunities in the area of security and stability in the "common neighborhood" (Roberts 2007, Schuette 2004, Kononenko 2004). Leinen (2005) writes that the issue of Kaliningrad, surrounded by European Union Member States, brought about significantly intensified relations between the EU and Russia, especially economic links, and these links have never been stronger.

The issue of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad became an impasse in EU-Russian relations that some observers argue could have been anticipated as a political problem for Russia. When the EU expanded to include the former Soviet nations of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the issue of Russian citizens' ability to transit from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia brought anger from Moscow. To prevent illegal migration and cross border crime from Russia, the EU insisted on the Schengen regime, which allows visa free travel for Member States' citizens, but excludes

non-members citizens. Russian citizens of Kaliningrad had to obtain visas to travel to mainland Russia by transit through EU Members States (Allison 2006; Stent 2007; Makarychev and Prozorov 2004).

A growing area of cooperation, according to Ludo Block (2007), is in cross-border policing between EU Member States with which Russia shares its borders. The impetus for expanded cooperation in the area of cross-border policing grew out of the perception that Russian organized crime was a threat to Western security. The Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region and the 1998 Northern Dimension Action Plan make provisions for mutual assistance, joint police operations, counter-terrorism, organized crime, including in Kaliningrad (Block 2007, 368; Rawlinson 2001, 1-2).

The police cooperation between the EU and the RF (Russian Federation) is based on two chief instruments, according to Block (379). The first is the European Union Action Plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organized crime,” which defines organized crime as a threat to legal business and commercial activities between the EU and the RF (Official Journal of the European Communities 2000). In the efforts to combat organized crime, there are “priority issues,” such as arms trafficking, which includes the sharing of technical, operational and strategic information and intelligence” (Block 2007, 379). Block notes that there is a lack of time frames and budgets in the Action Plan, as well as corrupt and inefficient practices by RF law enforcement officials. During bi-monthly liaison meetings between Russian and EU law enforcement officials in Brussels, there is little exchange of sensitive information, which is not surprising, and most of the initiatives for implementation of the Action Plan is from EU officials in Moscow (380).

Paddy Rawlinson (2001) disputes the extent of organized crime from Russia and even states that this “threat” is “reminiscent of the McCarthy era, was aided by the already existing Cold War rhetoric in which Russia and its territories were the defining threat to stability and democracy” (4). The incidence of crime that is attributable to Russian organized crime is, according to Rawlinson, small in comparison to Finnish and Baltic, domestic crime. Despite the evidence, according to Rawlinson, the focus continues to be on Russian crime, which one Estonian police official commented has diverted attention away from domestic crime. However, the JHA acquis of the EU imposes security concerns on candidate nations and requires reorganization of priorities (20-21).

In May 2005, the EU and Russia adopted the “Road Maps for the Four Common Spaces.” The Common Spaces reflect how the relationship has evolved beyond areas that were envisioned in the PCA (Emerson, Tassinari and Vahl 2006, 72). The concept of commonality and fostering common values through people-to-people contacts and contributions toward the successes of the EU-Russian economies are the purposes of the research and education portions of the Common Spaces. Scientific fields intended to foster EU-Russia cooperation in the Common Spaces include nanotechnologies, life sciences, informational society, and renewable energy (European Commission 2003, 45, 46). Under the cultural aspects, the intent of the Common Spaces is to:

strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity as the basis of vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines (European Commission 52).

The EU branch of Amnesty International (AI) released a report in June 2008 ahead of the EU-Russia Summit on the situation of human rights in Russia. The report details the

disappearances of people in relation to security forces in North Caucasus and the conflict in Chechnya. The center of the report is on police and criminal justice abuse, in relation to the Chechnya conflict and human rights activists and attorneys connected to the North Caucasus issues. There is also concern for forced “confessions” after torture by police, especially widespread police abuse in especially the issue of the North Caucasus conflict (5-6, 6-7, 1).

According to the European Commission, its policy aims are not only to combat organized crime, but “cooperation, carried out on the basis of common values such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,” that “must reflect the necessary balance between Security, on the one hand, and Justice and Freedom, on the other.” This aim is also to facilitate free travel for “all Europeans” while combating illegal migration, cross border crime and terrorism. The EU has human rights concerns regarding the Chechnya conflict, as well as functions of the judiciary and human rights abuses in law enforcement practices (European Commission 2008).

The EU and Russia discussed how to improve legal and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters. The parties welcomed the strengthening of cooperation and expressed hope that an agreement could soon be reached between Eurojust and Russia. The parties stressed the importance of effective implementation of the key international conventions on civil and criminal matters to which they are parties. The parties discussed the possibility of exploring an EC-Russia agreement on judicial cooperation in civil matters and continuing a dialogue on the experiences of states in the implementation of the Hague Conventions. The parties shall consider organizing joint-training events focusing on judicial cooperation in civil matters and the fight against corruption, and support the development of the legal and judicial systems (European Commission 2006).

Monkey Wrench Data – Georgia War

The six-day war between Russia and Georgia began on August 8, 2008. A day earlier, Georgian forces fired rockets at South Ossetian militias after Georgian forces accused South Ossetian militias of not honoring a ceasefire. In June and July, there was an escalation in hostilities, a tit-for-tat contest between Moscow and Tbilisi. The Georgian rocket attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of the South Ossetia province, killed several civilians and Russian peacekeepers attached to a peacekeeping mission. In return, Russian warplanes attacked targets in Georgia on the morning of August 8 and by August 10 Russian forces occupied all of South Ossetia and several Georgian towns. Russian warships landed in Abkhazia and Russian troops took up positions in that breakaway province (Valasek 2008, 1; Nichol 2009).

The Russia-Georgia conflict divided Europe and the European Union. On September 3, the European Parliament (EP) strongly condemned Russia's excessive use of force in the conflict and a resolution to halt the negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement was adopted. The European Parliament stopped short from imposing sanctions against Russia. Some Eastern EU Member States choose to support Georgia. The Moscow inspired declaration of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was condemned by the EU Council, the US and the international community. The United Kingdom wanted a tougher stance with Russia, however, some other EU members wanted to be more mindful of Russia as the major source of European oil and gas supplies (Nichol 2009; Council of the European Union, 2008; Philip P. Pan 2008).

Russia claimed that it was defending its citizens from violence. President Medvedev said, “If anyone thinks he can kill our citizens without being punished, or kill our soldiers and officers,

who are peacekeepers, we will never allow this.” The attack on Georgia proves, according to Russian officials, that the Russian military is a fighting force again. Some Russian officials were glad that there was some action to defend Russian interests in the “near abroad” (Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Andrew Wilson 2008, 5; British Broadcasting Company, August 18, 2008).

Despite the charges of excessive force used by Russia, France, which held the rotating EU Council presidency, refused to condemn any side, and Germany's Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested that “Europe should be an honest broker.” Steinmeier also welcomed the September 1 statement from the EU Council that “clearly call on the two sides not to continue the spiral of escalation.” As the holder of the EU Council's presidency, President Nicolas Sarkozy played a key role in obtaining the August 12, Six-Point ceasefire. The August 13 statement from the EU Council added to condemnation of the excessive force used by Russia and called on both combatants to honor their commitments to the Six-Point ceasefire plan. This plan included the return of Georgian forces to their “usual bases” and the return of Russian forces to their status “prior to the outbreak of hostilities of August 7” (Valasek 2008; Nichol 2009; Council of the European Union 2008; Germany - Federal Foreign Office 2008).

For Georgia, the EU promised reconstruction aid, a donor's conference and visa free travel. The August 13 statement from the EU Council called for reinforcement of the OSCE mission and the appointment of a special representative for Georgia. The EU made a commitment to “contribute actively to effective implementation to the principles” contained in the Six-Point ceasefire plan and to work for lasting peace in the region. Georgia agreed to a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which brought about 200 EU observers in addition to the UN and OSCE personnel already in the area (Council of the European Union 2008; Council of the European Union 2008).

The Six-Point Plan worked out by the French EU Presidency, despite critical assessments that it favored Russia, demanded Russian troops withdraw as a precondition to restart talks, which were set for September 15. A Russian official stated, “we don't need these talks or this new agreement any more than the EU does.” European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, responded, “we cannot continue as if nothing happened.” On September 1, Moscow said that it had withdrawn its troops to “security zones,” but there were still Russian troops on Georgian territory around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EU resumed some dialogue with Russia even after the talks were suspended. Javier Solana told a European Parliamentary committee that President Medvedev committed to the return of Russian forces back to the positions prior to the conflict, inside of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The removal of Russian forces from Georgian territory was to occur by October 10, which included the removal of Russian checkpoints. The suggestion that Russian troops were starting to pull out of Georgian towns caused an ease of the threat of EU sanctions (RTE 2008; Council of the European Union 2008; Philip P. Pan 2008; RTE 2008).

Russian troops began withdrawing on August 18 after the French threatened a "special summit on Russia." The withdrawal of Russian troops to the satisfaction of the European Union was achieved on October 8, 2008. On October 1, Javier Solana announced that the EU mission, along side of OSCE and UN personnel, were on the ground and that aid from the Member States was helping the refugees. At that time, Solana indicated that the withdrawal of Russian troops in compliance with the Six-Point peace plan was an urgent priority. On October 10, Javier Solana stated that EU monitors confirmed that Russian troops had withdrawn from Georgian territory and back into areas they held, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as required by the Six-Point peace plan (Council of the European Union 2008; Council of the European Union 2008; EUbusiness

2009). According to the EU mission statement the pull out of Russian troops was observed by the mission head, Ambassador Hansjörg Haber:

On 8 October, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) witnessed the withdrawal of Russian troops from a great number of checkpoints in the adjacent areas both to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Head of Mission, Ambassador Hansjörg Haber, said during a visit to the Zugdidi field office: 'I have been at the Iguri bridge to verify the withdrawal with my own eyes. There are reports from our monitors that checkpoints have been lifted throughout the adjacent areas. This is a very positive development.' According to the information EUMM has at this moment, Russia seems to have completed most of the withdrawal. However, EUMM observers are still on the ground to verify. With the Russian withdrawal, responsibility for the enforcement of law and order in the adjacent areas falls to the Georgian authorities.

The EU and Russia relationship was said to have "reached a crossroads" as a result of the crisis in Georgia. The September 10 address by Javier Solana to the European Parliament indicated that there will be a reexamination of the EU's relationship with Russia and that will be reflected at the summit. Prior to the EU-Russia summit the EU Council stated that dialogue and negotiation are the best means to pursue the EU's aims based on defending its values. The French Presidency stated that the partnership trust between the EU and Russia had been affected by the conflict, and that the desire to continue dialogue with Russia should not be taken to legitimize Russian actions in Georgia. The Council stated on September 1 that the work of the new partnership agreement was suspended, but that there "was no other desirable alternative to a strong relationship" (Council of the European Union 2008; Council of the European Union 2008).

The European Council considers that given the interdependence between the European Union and Russia, and the global problems they are facing, there is no desirable alternative to a strong relationship, based on cooperation, trust and dialogue, respect for the rule of law and the principles recognised by the United Nations Charter and by the OSCE. It was for this reason that we launched negotiations for a new framework agreement between the Union and Russia last July (Council of the European Union, October 6, 2008).

Policy papers published at the time of the Russia-Georgia conflict held and advanced a variety of viewpoints. The first of such papers was from Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Andrew Wilson (2008) and advanced the view that that short war was a threat to the European project from the old paradigms based on balance-of-power, spheres of influence and military conquest. These authors propose further engagement by the European Union in the eastern neighborhood rather than sanctions against Russia. The authors feel that Moscow is following the script of NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, complete with UN resolutions and prosecutors' investigations of human rights abuses in Georgia. The authors believe that Russia's use of military force to settle disputes in Georgia should be costly in its relationship with the EU. The EU should, along with the U.S., should take a more active role in bringing about resolutions to "frozen conflicts" that can stoked into hot conflicts and involve Russia in its near-abroad. According to Eberhard Sandschneider (2009), there has been little damage to EU-Russian cooperation in other areas as a result of the conflict. The author believes that conflicts over oil and energy can become a source of Russian-EU cooperation, and the author points out that Russia accepted the EU as a moderator in both its conflict with Georgia and the gas crisis with Ukraine. However, Russia is likely to view the EU's Eastern Partnership and any increased Western activity in the region as directed at Russia and its sphere of influence (2-4).

Tomas Valasek (2008) believes that the ceasefire obtained by the French Presidency acting on behalf of the European Union was an important achievement. However, more should have been done to aid Georgia, which has expressed its desire to join both the EU and NATO. The EU should stand up for the territory integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. Valasek points out that Moscow's main criticisms are the enlargement of NATO and U.S. missile defense in its "backyard." According to Valasek, Russia is not a rogue nation, but desires to be viewed to as a

respectable member of the international community. Since the leverage that the EU has is limited, Valasek believes that the EU should keep in mind Russian sensitivities on its role and status in the world, as well as its backyard. For Georgia, the EU should emphasize that recklessness could damage both EU and NATO membership prospects (3).

The European Commission's progress report on the Four Common Spaces dubbed 2008 “a challenging year for EU-Russia relations.” Despite the postponement of the negotiations for the PCA over the conflict in Georgia, the talks were restarted in November 2008. Another negative impact on EU-Russian relations was the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine that spawned a disruption of gas supplies to Europe. Despite the “challenging year,” the Commission reports that progress is being made on a new PCA was in the area of freedom, security and justice (2). Despite the short war and the gas dispute with Ukraine, the progress report reflects a continued relationship between the EU and Russia in areas of border security and police cooperation between EU Member States and Russia. The report points out that Russia participated in the ESDP mission in Chad by providing transport helicopters and 100 military personnel. Russia also participated in an EU effort to arrest pirates and secure shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia (3).

Chapter Six

ANALYSIS

SERBIA

The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic through the elective process was warmly received in Europe and the international community. Prior to the October 2000 elections, the European Union and other international actors set out a trial balloon by suggesting that sanctions against Serbia (Yugoslavia) could be lifted based on the outcome of the election. The EU set out the carrot of heating oil aid to those Serbian towns that opposed Milosevic, and this action can be seen to be the symbol of the EU's desire to steer Serbia in the direction of a responsible and European nation. While heating oil may be a physical carrot, Jeffery Checkel tells us that identities are open to shaping in a crisis and that the roles that groups, including nations, adapt and adopt are the socially easy ones. Serbia under the international and exclusion of the Milosevic government may have been open to a new identity that embraces the norms and values of dominant actors, such as the European Union. There were plenty of promises given to Serbia of expanded processes of humanitarian, reconstruction and stabilization programs for a post-Milosevic Serbia. We saw Javier Solana declare that “a vote against Milosevic was a vote for Europe” and European ministers were eager to lift the sanctions and build democracy in Serbia. A change in leadership in Belgrade through an election would be a signal of a change of identity in Serbia toward an identity that was open to “Europe.” The election of Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia party as the new, democratic leadership in Belgrade was an event that Europe's leaders could identify. The new president was more of a “we” than Milosevic, even as a climate of militant nationalism persisted in the country.

“Seminar diplomacy” began with the invitation of Kostunica to forums and conferences, and the new president was encouraged to participate in the stabilization and association process, reconciliation with neighbors, and other reforms along the lines of European standards. The presence of Kostunica at European forums, his popularity, and statements of the desire for Serbia to integrate into European and international structures reflected the new, Serbian identity, a “European prospective.” Indeed, we see the rationale for lifting the sanctions given by Canada was to “help create stability to build democracy” in Serbia. From the beginning, with the election overthrow of Milosevic, the European Union and the international community used conditionality and connected further aid and normal relations to election choices of Serbian voters.

The evolution of Serbia's national identity would reveal the ability to become “one of us,” a part of the post-Soviet, modern, responsible, western-democratic world that could be acceptable to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and especially the European Union. When Djindjic extradited Milosevic to the ICTY in the Netherlands, a split occurred between Kostunica and we saw that Kostunica was not as reform minded as those Serbian leaders that would follow, chiefly Boris Tadic and Vuk Jeremić. The reforms along those desired by the EU and other international actors, such as the extradition of Milosevic to The Hague, would contribute to Djindjic's murder, and this event would be another identity-changing crisis for Serbia. Djindjic's murder by militant nationalists in March 2003 indicated that violence and the old identity was not far from Serbian politics and social life. It was noted in Serbia's post-Milosevic transformation that the national leadership in Serbia had evolved “toward Europe.” Kostunica would oppose European Union offers for liberalized trade and visa-free travel, including the SAA, and even accuse the EU of trying to trick Serbia into accepting Kosovo

independence. Boris Tadic would represent further advancement in the Europeanization of Serbia as evidenced by further commitments to arrest ICTY inductees, the chief requirement for European Union association, the SAA and EU membership.

The evolution of Serbia's "European perspective" can be seen in Kostunica's election, but Kostunica and his nationalist sympathies were not "European" enough. Kostunica accepted European largess to oppose Milosevic, but did not accept the conditionality required from cooperation and relationships with the European Union. Conditionality, the adaptation of EU imposed norms, standards and values, are always included EU instruments that are offered to other Balkans nations, such as the Stabilization and Association Agreements. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe focuses on European values, such as democracy and human rights, but a belief that security and a lasting peace are achieved through economic recovery. We see that in April 2005, the European Commission had declared that Serbia was ready to enter into the SAA and then declared in 2008 that Serbia was ready to enter into candidate status. These instruments are used for all Balkans nations to facilitate what Alexander Wendt described as "showing others" and helps to engage in "long and sustained contact" that Jeffery Checkel especially describes as necessary for Europeanization. The European Commission assessments and progress reports are intended to "measure" and "test" the degree of "we-ness" of the target actor. European Union conditionality for Serbia has meant turning over those indicted by the ICTY.

The greatest speed bump for Serbia's EU membership is the capture of all indictees wanted by the ICTY, especially Radko Mladic, and without Mladic Serbia is said to "not be in full cooperation" with the Tribunal. In Brussels, after the capture of Radovan Karadzic, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic stated "we want to be a member of the European Union." Since an EU agreement must be approved by all Member States, the Netherlands has stuck to the "full

cooperation” mode with the Hague Tribunal, especially the requirement to capture Radko Mladic. The reforms pressed by Zoran Djindjic, along those desired by the EU and other international actors, such as the extradition of Milosevic to The Hague, would contribute to Djindjic's murder. Djindjic's murder by militant nationalists in March 2003 indicated that violence and the old identity was not far from Serbian politics and social life.

The burning of embassies in the February 2008, Kosovo independence riots also indicated that violent nationalism was not an acceptable form of political expression, as Serbian police and prosecutors sought prosecute the rioters. However, the largely Western mass media covering the events in Belgrade expected greater levels of organized political violence that the pro-Europe, Serbian government shunned and rejected. The importance of Kosovo to Serbian cultural and ethnic identity has prompted the country to fight, but though means that are acceptable both in international law and the means acceptable to the European Union. Any plan, including the Ahtisaari Plan, which would bring the a European Union, supervised autonomy to Kosovo, is still rejected by Belgrade.

The importance of Belgrade control over Kosovo is even shared by pro-Europe leadership, which includes rejection of the EU's mission even if a future membership in the European Union means a disappearance of national borders. Pro-Europe Serbian leaders declared in election campaigns and as policy that the fight for Kosovo is better fought inside the European Union. Modern Serbia, by the statement of Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić at NATO, is seeking to be a part of peace, reconciliation, stability, and avoiding conflicts of the past. There is evidence that once European identity, or “European prospective,” was created in Serbia, it was capable of resisting the resurgence of the murderous nationalism of the Milosevic days. Polls and surveys of Serbian citizens indicate that the European perspective is extremely strong in Serbia, with the

lowest percentage of support for Serbian EU membership found in 2008, probably due to the Kosovo issue, but even that low percentage was over 60 percent. Over 60 percent believe that Serbia should have its SAA with the European Union. The majority of Serbian citizens, even those that do not know about national efforts to join the EU, do know about the requirements to catch ICTY indictees, and believe that the bar is always raised for Serbia.

What was noted in Serbia's post-Milosevic transformation under the influence of Europeanization was that national leadership had evolved toward a more "European prospective." The administration of Boris Tadic would represent a further advancement in the Europeanization of Serbia as evidenced by further commitments to arrest ICTY inductees, the chief requirement for European Union association, the SAA, and EU membership.

Europeanization is described by the observers as a process that involves a change in national identity and this most certainly has occurred in Serbia. Serbian citizens continue to support their country's efforts to join the European Union, and this popular will was expressed at the voting both, first in the ouster of Milosevic and in the latest, post-Kosovo, parliamentary election.

Various instruments have been developed by the EU to "draw" Balkans nations "closer" to "Europe." The efforts that Serbia is making are clearly aimed at membership of the EU, which is a "take it or leave it" game from prospective candidate nations, and requires the acceptance of certain norms, values and standards. Some of these expected norms and values can be seen in a crisis in what is acceptable behavior in addressing an issue or a crisis, such as the perceived loss of Kosovo.

Monkey Wrench Test – Kosovo Independence.

The European Union encouraged the Kosovars to hold off on their drive for independence, fearing the return to instability and violence that characterized past Balkans relations. This attempt received a “nil” as it was ineffective in coaxing the Kosovars to work out their independence and settlement in coordination with Washington, Brussels and the United Nations. Throughout the Kosovo independence aftermath, there appeared to be an expectation on the part of the Western mass media that if the environment were to escalate into violence, it would surly be Serbian leaders that would be the chief instigators.

The expected, “Belgrade instigated” violence did not occur, and the violence that did occur was instigated by small groups. While some Serbian politicians of the liberal democrats pointed fingers at the nationalists of the Kostunica type, the main body of Serbia's political leadership condemned the violence and the riots “were regrettable.” Police and prosecutors were tasked to “round up the culprits.” The EU's demand was effective and “significant” as it caused a change in the protection of embassies and the prosecution of violent rioters. The effect was “cognitive,” as this is what the EU “is,” that it has association that was frozen as a result of violence against embassies. Even as we saw the nationalists blame Tadic's Democrats, the EU, and the U.S. for the “diplomatic crisis” of Kosovo independence, there was no government violence. Stepping up to its obligation to protect foreign embassies from rioting mobs was not only the expected behavior for “civilized” national governments, like Serbia, but expected behavior demanded by the European Union.

Nationalist politicians and leaders, mostly Kostunica, blocked the visa and trades agreements with the EU prior to Kosovo independence declaration. Kostunica's election victory that drove out Milosevic was celebrated and rewarded by the EU, but when it came to meeting

EU and international demands to hand over Milosevic, he objected. Although acceptance of Kosovo independence was not a requirement for Serbia's SAA and EU association, Kostunica insisted that this was a requirement for EU association. The attempt by the EU to ease the hurt of “losing Kosovo” was not only unsuccessful, it was viewed by Kostunica and like-minded nationalists as an attempt to get Serbia to accept Kosovo independence. After the parliament dissolved there was a concern that Serbian voters might choose the nationalists, the Radicals. Tadic and his Democrats vowed to fight for Kosovo through legal means and international laws. Tadic's Democrats argued that the fight for Kosovo is best waged inside of the European Union. Tadic's bloc of "For a European Serbia" candidates placed first in the 2008 parliamentary elections and received the most seats. There was one report that the signing of the SAA would impact the elections and one survey that indicated that 66% of Serbian citizens approved of the signing of the SAA. The policy aimed at helping pro-Europe parliamentarians was viewed as “marginal,” as the effect might have been beneficial to pro-Europe candidates in an indirect way, but most Serbian citizens already approved of the SAA and their country seeking European integration. The effect was also “empirical,” as what the EU “does” is to implement policy instruments to encourage further desired behavior. In this instance the desired behavior for Serbian voters was to vote for pro-Europe candidates that would further integration. An election victory by the Kostunica bloc would have meant a return to isolation and a halt to further European integration, including security association with NATO.

Table 6.1 – The “monkey wrench” analysis of the Kosovo independence.

Date	Input or Issue	Output	Outcome	Political Impact	Relative Impact	Measure
Up to Feb. 14	Prospect of Kosovar independence	Discouraged unilateral declaration by Kosovars and offered resolution w/ other international actors - feared violence	Serbia maintains that it opposes Kosovar independence	nil	US, Russia UN	cognitive
		Offers Serbia deal on open travel, education and trade	Nationalists in Serbia – PM Kostunica – argue that EU offer as a bribe to accept Kosovo independence	marginal		empirical
Feb. 14	Kosovar independence declaration	EU states that SAA not tied to Kosovo independence	Kostunica and nationalists state SAA tied to Kosovo independence	nil		cognitive
Feb 14 - 22	Riots in and Belgrade-burning of US embassy	Tells Serbia to protect embassies – freezes relationship talks	Serbia steps up police protection and arrests 200 rioters	significant		cognitive
April 30	Pending parliamentary election	Serbia signs SAA	To help pro-Europe parties in	marginal		empirical

parliamentary
elections

RUSSIA

The nature of Russia's relationship with Europe is one of “separate but linked.” The concept of Soviet thinkers that embraced Gorbachev's brand of Western philosophy wanted to Russia to “return to Europe” and to even join NATO. Today, in modern Russia, leaders like Vladimir Putin are Statists that view Russia as a great power and “exceptional in the world.” Relations with other international actors are to be based on common interests, not common values. Putin's vision of Russian relations with the European Union is not one where that adoption of a set of values is part of the relationship, but a partnership of equals. The Finnish author, Hiski Haukkala (2005), believes that the EU's attempt to impose values and conditionality to the EU-Russia partnership is hindering the relationship. What is counter productive in such a partnership, according to Haukkala, is an actor that has declared that it has no interest in EU membership and is removed from the conditionality that is routine for the EU in its relationships with target actors..

The December 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement defines norms and values as the “rules of the game” and attempts facilitate “gradual integration” of Russia into Europe. Part of the PCA is the “assumption of shared values” based on “a historical relationship” between Russia and Europe. The agreement holds “regular, political dialogue,” human rights, the rule of law, democracy, as major themes and requirements of economic integration. The instrument of a Common Strategy held out the goals for Russia of an open, stable democracy, the rule of law, stability of European and global security, as well as European values. The EU-Russia relationship is often deadlocked, and Cynthia Roberts (2007) believes that the imposition of

“European values” on Russia is senseless and counterproductive. Some Russian elites view the imposition of such values and standards in relation to the standpoint of Russian sovereignty. Russia wants a partnership of equals, not the “take it or leave it game” of potential member states, based on common interests, not values imposed from the outside. Roberts argues that it is Russia that has the leverage in its relationship with the EU through the use of the oil and gas spigot.

Rolf Schuette (2004) argues that “common European values” are high hopes and expectations for Russia. Yet, Russia sees EU expansion as less threatening than NATO expansion. The authors argue that the modes of integration of Russia into the larger world through the use of conditionality are likely to end in failure. There is cooperation in the area of border control and border security within the “common neighborhood,” which may have grown out of the Kaliningrad transit issue. The detached part of Russia came into focus when the EU expanded to include Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and visa-free travel for the EU citizens of these Member States under the Schengen open-border regime. Russian citizens of Kaliningrad then required a visa to travel to mainland Russia. This rift with Russia could have been foreseen, but working out the details surrounding the Kaliningrad issue opened the door for further cooperation in the area joint police cooperation.

What we see in the Four Common Spaces from the data above is the development of a security relationship in that area of police cooperation and border management. In the Road Map for the Common Spaces instrument, the European Union is attempting to foster its common values through people-to-people contacts in the areas of education and research in the cultural area. These cultural areas of the Common Spaces serve to strengthen the European identity based on democratic values, civil society, diversity, and norms for the Russian mindset, sent through the

backdoor of education and scientific research. The Common Spaces in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (JHA) in cooperation with fighting crime involve bringing democratic values and respect for human rights and common values of democracy. However, Amnesty International states that human rights violations in police abuse and prison conditions remain a problem, but there have been some general improvements in criminal justice system. The recent murders of human rights activists have brought about unwanted international attention and this type of international attention usually prompts Russia to correct deficiencies.

When Russia cooperates with the EU, it appears to be greater in areas that Russia chooses to cooperate. Russia has declared that it has no intention to integrate into Western institutions, including the European Union. The view held by Russian leaders, such as Putin appears to be one of Russia as a great and exceptional country that should maintain its “spheres of influence” and its own national values. Russia could be open to security cooperation, provided that cooperation is based on common interests and not common values. The authors argue that Russia's democracy has backslid, and Russia could be even less compatible, less like “us.” The authors argue that different approaches need to be developed for engaging Russia that do not impose values and cooperation based on conditionality, which is the usual mode of engagement for the European Union. In reality, a realist or rationalist paradigm would probably yield better results for analysis of Russia than those used in this study which are based on neoliberal and social constructivist paradigms. However, it appears that a crisis for security of Russian citizens, such as Kaliningrad, spurs further cooperation with Russia in the area of security issues, and this was the issue stated by Russia in its conflict with Georgia.

Monkey Wrench Data – Georgia War

The resurgent, realist outlook of Russian interests in its near-abroad can be seen in the August 2008 invasion of Georgia to “protect Russian citizens and servicemen.” The EU's main role of securing a ceasefire was been hailed by a couple of authors as an example of EU-Russian cooperation. The EU itself was divided over the response to the invasion of Georgia, but the role of the French Presidency of the Council was instrumental in obtaining a ceasefire, even as Russian troops still reside in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in greater numbers than before the war.

A 2008, post conflict report on the Four Common Spaces indicated that Russia continues to participate in security interests, including in ESDP missions. It is difficult to see if the Six-Point Plan and promise of troop withdrawal in compliance with the plan had an immediate effect on the speed of Russian troop withdrawal. A faster troop withdrawal did occur when Russia was threatened by the prospect of sanctions. Russian troop withdrawal that was viewed by EU observers to be in compliance with the Six-Point Plan did not occur until October 8. Although the ceasefire was viewed as a success by the EU and observers, it was “marginal” as the EU output cannot be viewed as having an effect on Russian vital interests other than bring a promise from President Medvedev to withdraw troops. The defense of Russian citizens and service personnel, the "restoration of security," were the stated reasons for actions in Georgia and not reactions of the EU, which are hard to see, but noticeable though the agreement on the Six-Point Plan. President Medvedev may have been playing a socially correct role in accepting the Six-Point Plan as it was an easy and acceptable role to take in the international crisis. The Russians viewed the conflict as a demonstration of the ability to defend Russian interests with the use of

military force. Moscow appeared to script the South Ossetia and Abkhazia crisis based on the 1999 NATO action against Milosevic over Kosovo.

The other message Russian leadership brought out of the conflict is that the Russian military is capable and recovered from the 1990s crisis. Russia can now assert itself and defend its interests. Some authors viewed this injection of realism in the Caucasus by Russia as a threat to the European project, which sought to end the use of force between nations as a method of solving problems. The conclusion of the review of EU- Russian relationship was that more dialogue and engagement of Russia and the Caucasus states was needed, not less, and certainly not sanctions. Even as the conflict was in progress, the EU stayed engaged and did not cut off communications with either Russia or Georgia. The maintenance of neutrality and perception of acting as an “honest broker” was a good policy. The long-term plan on the part of the European Union is to keep up dialogue with Russia on common problems, as dialogue is viewed as trust-building measure to enhance stability, security and cooperation. Perhaps in the long term there might be further security cooperation between the EU and Russia. Russia has increased cooperation in terms of providing personnel for an ESDP mission in the past year, and there could have been some trust built between the EU and Russia from the Georgia conflict. Russia also accepted EU mediation of its dispute with Ukraine over gas and oil supplies. The crisis may have opened up Russia to further dialogue that can lead to further identity change.

Russian history and identity include debates in Moscow about Russia's place in Europe, or apart from Europe, and Russia's role in relation to Europe. There appears to be little damage to the EU-Russia relationship over the war in Georgia, and there appears to be a desire to increase the presence of the EU in the region of Georgia. The EU as a security actor in this region should continue to use dialogue to build trust with Russia, as well as Georgia, and continue to use

dialogue to “defend European values.” There is no other alternative, according to EU leaders, than to build a strong relationship with Moscow through the use of dialogue and engagement.

Table 6.2 - The “monkey wrench” analysis of the Russia-Georgia.

Date	Input or Issue	Output	Outcome	Political Impact	Relative Impact	Measure
August 8-14	Invasion and occupation of parts of Georgia	The six-point ceasefire plan by French Council Presidency	Promise from President Medvedev to withdraw	marginal		empirical
	Slowness of Russian withdrawal	Suspension of talks on a new PCA-threats of sanctions	Some troop withdrawal	marginal		cognitive
August 4	Independence declaration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia	Condemnation and demands that candidate nation do not recognize	Russia states that this is not reversible	nil		cognitive
Sept. 8	Refugees and displaced persons	Aid package		nil		empirical
Oct. 1	Desire to increase presence in region	EU observation mission in Georgia	Supported EU observer mission	marginal		empirical
Oct. 8	Russian withdrawal that is visible to EU monitors	Eventually agreed to start talks on PCA in November		marginal		cognitive

Comparative Analysis between Russia and Serbia.

What should be noted is the active policy that Serbia has in pursuing European Union membership. This active policy includes “full cooperation” with the ICTY and was dramatically seen in July of 2008 after the capture and extradition of Radovan Karadzic to The Hague. The Serbian Government has an Office of EU Integration and extensive policy plans of European integration to facilitate national transformation toward European standards. By contrast, Russia's cooperation can be described as passive and only in areas that Russia deems as “common interest.” Russia has stated that its relationship with the European Union and the West should be based on “equality” and “common interests.”

There was a greater presence of the European Union in the Kosovo crisis with Serbia than in the Georgia crisis with Russia. What the European Union thinks and does about the violence in Belgrade that targeted foreign embassies is of considerable importance. Putting aside the statements of blame from Serb nationalists, the response to the violence was to catch the perpetrators, protect the embassies, and bring an end to the violence. The quick response of Serbia to the violence in Belgrade can be contrasted to the slow response of Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia in compliance with the Six-Point Plan. It would take two months for Russia to withdraw its forces from Georgia in compliance with the EU brokered, Six-Point Plan and set in motion the restart of talks on a new partnership agreement.

The importance of Kosovo to Serbian religious and cultural identity and the perceived loss should be noted. What should also be noted is the desire of Serbia to choose “acceptable, legal means” to recover Kosovo without violence. There is no importance of Georgia to Russian religious and cultural identity, but Russia went to war and invaded Georgia for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia gave South Ossetia and Abkhazia an “independence from Georgia” that was

condemned and is not recognized in the mainstream international community. In contrast to Milosevic's violent actions in Kosovo in 1999, the lack of Serb government violence after the 2008 Kosovo independence declaration can be seen as a change in Serbian identity. This new identity incorporates the international and European norms and appropriate behavior to engage in the “fight for Kosovo.”

Serbia is active in its engagement with the European Union while cooperation between Russia and the European Union grows out of a crisis. The rift between Russia and the European Union over the Kaliningrad transit issue brought out greater cooperation in cross-border policing and law enforcement between Russia and the EU member states that share the borders. The crisis over Georgia brought more interest in “European security” out of Moscow. Russia did demonstrate this interest in European security by its military-support contribution to an ESDP mission in Africa. The recommendations from authors and European officials are that there is no other method of relations with Russia other than a strong relationship and more dialogue. When we note the dependence that Europe has on Russian oil, we see the greater leverage that Russia has over the European Union. In contrast to Russia, the EU has a powerful leverage tool over Serbia and other candidate nations through the grants of association and membership.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSIONS

Addressing hypotheses and the research question

There are a couple of observations that we can make when deciding what the role of the European Union is as an international security actor through the use of Europeanization. Setting a goal for a target actor of future membership in the European Union is a powerful tool to facilitate Europeanization in a target actor. A crisis can help facilitate Europeanization as a crisis often creates many intense contacts between international actors. A crisis can tell us about the national identity of the target actor. Socially constructed meanings of “European values” are communicated to the target actor through agreements and partnerships with the European Union. There are expected behaviors and norms that are both acceptable in the international community (protect foreign embassies from rioters) and required to be judged as “European” by the European Union.

Membership aspirations enhance security. The second hypothesis of “drawing closer relationships to a security community help to bring about more peaceful and quicker resolutions to crisis” is true. A target actor that draws closer to the European Union (a security community) for the purpose of membership and/or association, such as access to trade, has a stake in what others in the community think about its worthiness for association. The intervening variable of European Union membership enhances stability and security. The first observation from the two target actors is that the seeking of European Union membership requires, as it is known, a target actor to adopt the various norms, values and standards to qualify for association with “Europe.” The target actor has a stake in how the European Union and its Member States perceive the target actor's conduct and behavior especially when the target actor is in crisis. Noutch, Tocci

and Coppieters (2004) tell us that cooperation with the ICTY on the part of Balkans nations is seen as a “normative” side of Europeanization that is a part of justice, recognition of past crimes, and reconciliation from the 1990s conflicts. Anastasakis (2005) states that this is a process of socialization that includes democratic values, security concerns, justice cooperation, reconciliation between former foes, is based on political and moral principles. The Europeanization can be seen in Serbian citizens’ consistent high levels of support for their country’s relationship to the European Union. This support can be seen through the choice of pro-Europe candidates at the ballot box and public surveys that demonstrate consistent high levels of support for Serbia’s EU aspirations. The security aspect of Serbia’s European prospective can be seen through the nation’s active seeking of instruments of European integration, the Stabilization and Association Agreement, association with NATO, and cooperation with the ICTY in the arrest of especially Radovan Karadzic.

The security and stability benefits of association with the European Union mean that enlargement and engagement is a useful tool set for common foreign and security policy. The first hypothesis, “*part of the common foreign and security policy function is to export values and norms that are shared in the European Union as a form of global integration,*” is also true most of the time. However, the target actor must agree to play by the rules of the European Union and the international community. The hypothesis can be said to be false when Russia does not agree to be integrated into Europe or the international community. Serbia is demonstrating that it is a worthy part of the “we” of the EU and the Member States and its community. Serbia is demonstrating its European prospective is a national identity that has adopted European values and is in the process of adopting European standards through the SAA, which contains the *acquis* required for EU membership. Russia has stated that it does not seek EU membership, but that it

is a great and exceptional nation that has its spheres of influence in its exclusive neighborhood, and demands to be treated as an equal in partnerships. Norms and values of that are “European” can only be spread to target actors that are receptive and willing to receive such “instruction” in the form of EU conditional agreements and partnerships. The third hypothesis, that “*Europeanization is a useful form of security policy*” is also true, but only if the target actor is willing to play by EU imposed rules.

The practice of sustained engagement can produce results in security and stability. The EU practices sustained engagement and sustained dialogue with target actors in crisis. The communications and sustained dialogue which help create the Six-Point Plan and ceasefire was celebrated as an achievement of the EU and the French Council President’s diplomacy. The prospect of positive relations with Yugoslavia (Serbia) during Milosevic’s tenure was something that most international actors found unthinkable. Yet, the European Union absolutely desired that Serbia “come out of the dark” and “rejoin the European family.” Even after rioters burned and vandalized U.S. and foreign embassies, the EU froze association talks, but did not totally close down communication. Even as Russia was assailing Georgia, the EU, though the French Council Presidency, maintained both contacts and pressures on Russia to withdraw troops from Georgia.

Sustained engagement also included the creation of instruments of head off potential crisis in Serbia, such as trade and visa liberalization, but in the context of Serbia, this practice was view as a bribe to accept Kosovo independence. At the same time, sustained engagement helped the pro-Europe candidates win the majority in the parliamentary elections. Jeffery Checkel and tell us that national identities are the most open to change in times of crisis and that lead actors to take roles that are appropriate –and easy – for the social setting. A crisis produces intense and numerous contacts between international actors. After prolong engagement, the role

playing becomes a matter of habit, and perhaps President Medvedev was just role playing? Some authors believe that the EU success in the Russia-Georgia ceasefire has already opened up limited engagement between Russia and the EU. Sustained engagement and the building of a strong relationship with Russia is now the EU's post-Georgia conflict policy. Norms and values that are "European" can only be spread under sustained contact with the target actor.

The final answer to the question: *What is the European Union's role as an international security actor since the end of the Cold War?* The answer to this question is that the European Union *is* an effective, largely non-military, security actor though its self defined role to spread its values and norms (democracy, justice, peace, reconciliation, human rights, conflict resolution). Many of these norms and values are shared by other international actors, such the United States and the United Nations. The European Union performs this security task though conditional association, sustained contacts, and instruments that define the "rules of the game" for relationships, and then facilitates rewards and benefits for compliance, such as aid, trade, visa-free travel and membership. This is the process of Europeanization.

Issues for further study

This is a study of the effects of the crisis long after a conclusion of the crisis is reached. A question could be: "Has relations between the EU and Russia deepened after the conflict with Georgia?" There is good cooperation between Russia and the EU in the area of international law enforcement and organized crime. This was believed to have occurred after there were questions of Russian citizens' ability to transit to mainland Russia from Kaliningrad through the EU's eastern member states after enlargement. Also, there was a prospect that criminals could benefit from free transit and that is viewed as an important area for EU-Russian law enforcement. In the

intense and sustained contacts of crisis over Georgia, could there now be better opportunities for EU-Russian cooperation in security and stability?

There appears to be an evolution in target actor leadership toward “Europe.” Continued and sustained contacts between the EU and the target actor, chiefly Serbia, did show a trend toward Europeanization. The evolution of a target actor toward “European values” fits within the larger culture. Serbia values Kosovo and also EU membership – and the conclusion of pro-Europe Serbian leaders is that Kosovo is best fought for inside the EU, other international legal forums, in a manner that is both acceptable to the EU and other international actors. This evolution appears to fit with the theories and works proposed by Wendt, Waeber, Checkel, Adler and Barnett, which are based on Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities and role of interaction among target actor, especially the all-important “we-feeling” creation. However, yet another issue for further study are the roles and contributions of non-governmental organizations and civil societies in the interactions in target actors’ domestic Europeanization.

The “Monkey Wrench” test when used in a crisis helps to visualize the target actor’s responses to EU outputs during the crisis event. Also, the view of a target actor’s relation to the EU cannot be gaged only through the reading of progress reports and think tanks studies. Real national identity can be seen in a crisis event. However, in the instance of Russia-Georgia crisis, it was not imminently apparent that the Six-Point Plan and the EU pressure actually facilitated the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia, but it does appear that the Six-Point Plan did result, eventually, in Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia. The Monkey Wrench test can tell us both the presence of the EU in a crisis and the reaction of the target actor to EU actions and initiatives.

There are two main problems with this study. The first is that there is an enormous amount of data that can be accessed through the Internet, think tanks and news sources. The second factor in this study is time limitations for this study's completion. This type of study requires a long –term view at the enormous amount of data and a view of evolving relations well after the crisis resolution.

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